Wednesday, May 20, 2026

Ultimate ontology

 

 

 

 

 

Ultimate ontology

= at least an ontology comprising a noumenal substrate (having proto-mental features), which manifests in the form of the physical for the mental, which is contingently generated by the noumenal substrate.

: The thesis that the mental is grounded in the physical is a close approximation to the thesis that the mental is fully grounded in the "noumenal substrate".

: As such, the mental can roughly epistemically access the noumenal substrate.

: Thus, for instance, space and time are not necessarily subjectively constructed features.

: Ultimate ontology is dynamic; it changes from a state without consciousness to a state where consciousness has been generated.

 

 

 Proto-mentality

: Proto-mentality has two features: (1) receptive and (2) generative.

: That the noumenal substrate manifests as the physical to be perceived/intentionalized/reasoned about by the mental shows the receptive feature.

: That the noumenal substrate generates the mental shows the generative feature.

 

The physical

= the total set of dynamically changing manifestations

= what the "noumenal substrate" manifests for the mental as an interface between the "noumenal substrate" and the mental

: Although the physical is in its representational form not independent of the mental (the qualia of redness would not exist without a phenomenal subject having a visual cortex), the ontology of the noumenal substrate is independent of an occurrence of mentality.

: Say we somehow alter the physical brain (some sort of interface between the part of the "noumenal substrate" and our "mental") by injecting chemicals or doing surgical operation. Then our consciousness changes. That we made changes to the physical brain means that we made changes to the portion of the noumenal substrate underlying the physical brain. As such, our inputs to the physical (interface) can be a way to alter the mental (originating from the noumenal substrate). In a sense, the noumenal substrate, via mentality originating from the noumenal substrate, has made changes to the noumenal substrate itself.

 

 

The mental

= That which is generated by the noumenal substrate and for that which the noumenal substrate manifests as the physical

= That which performs first order intentionalization ("perception") of the physical and higher order intentionalization ("reasoning" about the "perception" or "reasoning" about the "reasoning" itself, or reasoning about the reasoning about a property)

 

Intentionalization

= forming "aboutness" regarding a mental/physical object from a higher-level standpoint

 

Relation between the mental and the physical  

While mentality has something in common with the physical, it also has some distinction from the physical.

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: If mentality were totally identical to the physical, how could intentionalization of the physical even take place? They would be totally undistinguishable, and no meaningful higher-level standpoint could be established. The physical is an approximate representation of the noumenal substrate for the mental, and the mental is generated from the noumenal substrate. This suggests that the mental features a higher-level standpoint on the physical, as the physical is partly an interface or "representation" for the mental.

=>Consider Robert Hanna's psychocentric predicament.

It is the case that retention1=neural integration (i.e., retention is reducible into physical neural integration), but understanding this requires retention2.

 

: If mentality were totally different from the physical, how could intentionalization of the physical even take place? The mental would be totally alienated from the physical, being unable to establish any epistemic contact with the physical. They must share something in common. The physical is an approximate representation of the noumenal substrate for the mental, and the mental is generated from the noumenal substrate. This shows an overlap between the two.         

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


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