Ultimate ontology

 

 

 

 

Ultimate ontology

= at least an ontology comprising a mind-independent substrate (having proto-mental features) for the physical, which is manifested by the at least ontology for the mental, which is contingently generated by the mind-independent substrate.

 

: The thesis that the mental is grounded in the physical is a close approximation to the thesis that the mental is fully grounded in the "mind-independent substrate".

: The gap between the ultimate ontology and the physical is the at least proto-mental features

: Ultimate ontology is dynamic; it changes from a state without consciousness to a state where consciousness has been generated.

: The latter ultimate ontology per se includes both the whole mentality and the at least ontology generating the mental.

: The epistemological consideration of the ultimate ontology per se is necessarily incomplete, and this incompleteness is the essence of the epistemology.

 

 

The physical

= the total set of dynamically changing manifestations

= what the "mind-independent substrate" manifests for the mental

: the mental fails to see the proto-mental properties in themselves,

: Although the physical is in its representational form not independent of the mental (the qualia of redness would not exist without a phenomenal subject having a visual cortex), the substrate of the physical is ontologically independent of mentality.

 

The mental

= That which is generated by the mind-independent substrate and for that which the mind-independent substrate manifests as the physical

= That which performs first order intentionalization ("perception") of the physical and higher order intentionalization ("reasoning" about the "perception" or "reasoning" about the "reasoning" itself, or reasoning about the reasoning about a property)

 

Intentionalization

= forming "aboutness" regarding a mental/physical object from a higher-level standpoint

 

Ontological overlap and distinction between the physical and the mental

While mentality has something in common (originating from the same ontological base) with the physical, it also has some distinction (epistemic level difference) from the physical.

: If mentality were totally identical to the physical, how could intentionalization of the physical even take place? They would be totally undistinguishable, and no meaningful higher-level standpoint could be established.

: If mentality were totally different from the physical, how could intentionalization of the physical even take place? The mental would be totally alienated from the physical, being unable to establish any epistemic contact with the physical.

: Thus there must be sufficient distinction for representation as well as sufficient overlap for epistemic contact.

 

 

Proto-mentality

: proto-mentality bridges between mentality and physicality through the two functional roles: (1) receptive and (2) generative.

: That the physical can be perceived by the mental is owing to the receptive feature.

: Nomological laws including physical laws or even psychophysical laws, which reflect a retention-like structure, demonstrate this receptive feature.

: That the mental is generated by the "mind-independent substrate" is owing to the generative feature.

 

 

 

 

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