Rethinking
Human and Machine Intelligence under Determinism
Abstract
This paper
proposes a metaphysical framework for distinguishing between human and machine
intelligence. Specifically, it posits two identical deterministic worlds -- one
comprising a human agent and the other comprising a machine agent. These agents
exhibit different types of information processing mechanisms despite their
apparent sameness in a causal sense. By postulating the distinctiveness of
human over machine intelligence, this paper resolves what it refers to as “the
vantage point problem” – namely, how to legitimize a determinist’s assertion of
determinism by placing the determinist within the universe.
Keywords: determinism; computationalism; simulation;
state description; counterfactuals
Introduction
When a determinist asserts that the universe is
deterministic, this requires assuming a hypothetical vantage point from which
to describe the universe. At first sight, it seems reasonable to say that such
a vantage point should be located somewhere beyond the universe. For instance,
Wittgenstein (1922) notes that “the philosophical I” is a “metaphysical
subject” that is “not a part of the world” (p. 75). Determinism is a
philosophical judgment imposed upon the world. Accordingly, the determinist’s
reasoning mind may have to be separated from the world. However, the determinist
herself is a part of the world. According to Danielsson (2023), since “[w]e
cannot stand outside the world,” “we always look at the world from the only
vantage point that exists: from within. (Chapter 1)”
The above peculiar relationship between the two (i.e.,
the determinist vs. universe) can cause confusion. The determinist is a finite
being located within space and time. Then, how could she justify the significance
of her assertion of determinism, which is a view that seems to require
attainment of a God’s-eye perspective? This issue will be referred to as the “vantage
point problem” in this paper.
To address the problem, this paper proposes to discuss two
different types of deterministic worlds. If readers patiently follow this paper’s
arguments to the end, they will see how it establishes a plausible model that
allows a determinist to validly claim our universe as deterministic while remaining
a part of it.
1. Deterministic Knowledge
This paper will use the following key definitions:
(1) Deterministic
knowledge (D knowledge): A totality of facts associated with
all the past, present, and future events in a deterministic world.
(2) Deterministic
world: A world where events are deterministic. There is
metaphysical significance in considering a case of providing D knowledge to a
cognitive agent of this world.[1]
Definition (1) is similar to Carnap’s (1947) “one state-description”
(he notes that this idea was inspired by Wittgenstein) (p. 10). Specifically,
it “describes the actual state of the universe” and “contains all true atomic
sentences and the negations of those which are false.” However, Carnap primarily
devised this concept in relation to a semantical system for linguistic
analysis. Meanwhile, D knowledge relates to descriptions of a deterministic
world. In this regard, these two notions are different. Nevertheless, following
Carnap, we will assume that D knowledge is an entirety of atomic sentences that
describe a deterministic world.
Definition (2) introduces a seemingly contradictory idea.
If D knowledge were provided to the agent, it suggests that she could gain
knowledge about her future. However, if she did attain such knowledge, the D
knowledge would no longer be valid because it fails to describe one particular
event: her attainment of the knowledge. To address this apparent contradiction,
this paper will examine reception of D knowledge in a metaphysical sense only.[2]
Now let us define two deterministic worlds.
(i) An original world like ours that comprises a human
agent.
(ii) A simulated world that replicates every aspect of the
original world and comprises a machine agent emulating the human agent in a
causal manner.[3]
According to Schwartz (2012), determinism is the view
“that [possible] worlds cannot be the same up to a point and then diverge” (p.
216). However, in our thought experiment, it is possible that the deterministic worlds (i) and (ii) are
computationally identical up to a particular point and then diverge when D
knowledge is provided to them. If one contends that the human mind cannot be
fully reduced to an algorithm, it becomes necessary to assume that such a
divergence is possible.
For further discussion, this paper will use
concepts of computationalism to investigate the characteristics of information
processing exhibited by both agents. According to Beraldo-de-Araújio,
the essence of computation is “symbolic manipulation” and concerns “mapping
function between two sets of symbols” (Polak & Krzanowski, 2019, p. 6). The
human agent’s symbolic manipulation, for instance, may take place through
neural activities in the brain. Meanwhile, the machine agent performs symbolic
manipulation by processing machine-readable symbols. By slightly changing Beraldo-de-Araújio’s
definitions on p.6, this paper defines computation as follows.
(a) A process is a function P: I → O such that its domain
I is a set whose elements are called input events
and its co-domain O is a set whose elements are called output events, while both I and O are subsets
of a physical world. For all x∈I, y = P(x) (y∈O) is a corresponding output
event.
(b) A computer is a function C: S → T from a set of input
symbols S to a set of output symbols T, such that C(x̅) is outputted
by computing x̅. (x̅ is a symbolic representation of x.) A process P: I → O is
computational if P is generated by a computer C.
In the simulated world, we suppose that the
mind is a “classical von Neumann computer” and that “its representation-bearers
[are] data structures” (Frankish
& Ramsey, 2012, pp. 31-32).[4]
This world is intentionally designed to avoid being based on a “connectionist”
model.[5]
Specifically, it may not be feasible for the connectionist model to accurately
emulate the human agent due to its highly stochastic nature.[6]
Such a feature might hinder accurate realization of a scripted scenario. Although
the classical model may be much less sophisticated, it can at least robustly
emulate human behaviors in hindsight if all the relevant information is
available.
1.1 Type 1
If the D knowledge specific to the simulated world is
provided to its agent, the agent would process reception of the D knowledge simply
as one of the existing potential input events. This suggests that the agent
executes rigid processing, as it cannot process in any other way an input that
it was not capable of processing. This
world is trivially deterministic in that it is governed by a predefined
type of D knowledge (i.e., Type 1) that dictates
how things should occur.
See the following mappings.
I = {x1, x2, …, xn}
O = {y1, y2, …, yn}
Since this is a fully deterministic world, only one
predetermined event from the input set is destined to occur. The pairs other than
the actual input-output pair are included to illustrate counterfactual cases for
the sake of a real-world-like appearance. These cases are also included in
Type-1 D knowledge. Now, suppose that reception of D knowledge occurs
immediately before a particular event in the input event set does. Then:
xD = xk (xD is reduced
to xk.) 1 ≤ k ≤ n
xD = Reception of D knowledge
yD = yk
yD = Response to reception of D knowledge
To illustrate the triviality of the simulated world, let
us consider a hypothetical scenario involving a clinical psychologist named “Millicent”
(or simply “Millie”). She loves coffee but often hesitates whether to drink it.
One morning, she decides to have a coffee anyway while watching a seminar video
through a tablet device. The following event
mappings are established for her in atomic-sentential form:
x1 = The seminar tires me.
x2 = The coffee does not convince me of
insomnia.
x3 = The coffee convinces me of insomnia.
y1 = I stop watching.
y2 = I keep drinking.
y3 = I stop drinking.
However, since the world is deterministic, only one
particular event such as x1 would have been configured to occur.
Meanwhile, in a metaphysical sense, it is possible to assume that specific
descriptions in the D knowledge could be provided to her immediately before x1
happens. Suppose that her tablet displays not only the above mappings but also
a short history of her activities in the morning and the events to unfold
throughout the day. How would she respond?
From a humanistic perspective, there must be a distinct
mental representation corresponding to the event of “I see the descriptions.”
However, Millie’s rigid processing mechanism would only be able to interpret
the sight of the display as one of x̅1 to x̅3. Recall that
Millie’s mind follows the classical computer model whose representation-bearers
are data structures. Since she only executes rigid processing, a bit structure
corresponding to her symbolic representation of the event would most probably
be translated to a particular bit structure corresponding to one of x̅1 to
x̅3. Suppose that it is interpreted as x̅3. Then, her
processing mechanism would output y̅3, which should be accompanied
by y3. In other words, she would probably stop drinking her coffee
in response to receiving the D knowledge. This result is not surprising because
only the predefined sets of inputs/outputs were configured for the simulated
world.
1.2 Type 2
If the D knowledge specific to the original world were
provided to its agent, the agent would process reception of the D knowledge as
a different input event than all the other previous potential input events.
This means that the agent’s processing mechanism exhibits emergent processing,
as it can distinctly identify a particular input event that was not supposed to
happen. Further, it is possible (rather
than necessary) that the D knowledge only reflects every physical event across time. Unlike Type 1, this type
of D knowledge (namely, Type 2) does NOT include counterfactual cases. Also, this
knowledge is compatible with the block universe theory.
In the
block universe model, “[w]hether past, present or future, all events ‘lie
frozen’ in the four-dimensional block, much like the scenes from a movie are
fixed on the film roll” (Thyssen, 2020, p. 6). If one were to see the events of
the universe like fixed scenes on a film roll from an omniscient viewpoint across
time, she might be able to extrapolate to a certain extent counterfactual cases
in relation to those events. However, the scenes themselves do not include such
information. In that sense, Type-2 D knowledge only mirrors the physical
events.
Despite its assertion that the past, present, and future
all coexist, the block universe theory does not demand absolute causality.
Polkinghorne (2007) notes that “[b]elievers in the block universe are not
forced to commit themselves to a deterministic account of its causal structure”
(p. 977). Nevertheless, we assume that emergence
of a new output in response to D knowledge reception (“xn+1”) is necessary
in a metaphysical sense, considering that the agent’s processing mechanism is
assumed to be governed by causality. However,
the content of the new output
may be deterministic or non-deterministic. This is highlighted by the question
mark in the mappings below. The pairs other than the actual input-output pair
are provided as dummies whose contents are unknown (which means that the
counterfactual cases are unknown). In addition, “xn+1” is included
in parentheses to illustrate its distinction from the other dummies.
I = {x1, x2, …, xn, (xn+1)}
O = {y1, y2, …, yn, (?)}
xD = xn+1 yD = ?
If the Millie scenario happened in the original world,
she might have been struck to the core and asked, “Am I living in a Matrix?” by
emergently interpreting her reception of D knowledge.
But how can we be certain that the real Millie would
respond differently from her simulated counterpart? Recall from the paper’s
first footnote that contemporary metaphysicians (e.g., Vihvelin (2023)) accept
the metaphysical possibility of time travel to the past. Time travel would not
simply suggest the displacement of one’s body. It would also mean that the time
traveler could bring some of the accumulated knowledge about the world to the
past. In this case, it would be hard to imagine that an agent in the past would
show only a robot-like reaction to the knowledge of her future.
1.3 Type 3
Now assume that the original world is thoroughly
deterministic in a causal sense.
Then, one can entertain the idea that its agent’s decision-making processes are
strictly deterministic in a metaphysical as well as physical sense. Specifically,
the agent should produce a new output (whose content is deterministic) in
response to receiving D knowledge of Type 2. This hypothetical situation would
generate a derivative version of D knowledge (namely, D’). Then, the agent
should produce another output in response to receiving D’, thereby generating
another derivative version of D knowledge (namely, D’’). To aid in
understanding this somewhat complex scenario, let us go back to the Millie
story. With regard to the Millie of the original world, D’ knowledge might
state as follows:
“Millie responds to D knowledge. She speaks, “Am I living
in a Matrix?”
D’’ knowledge might state:
“Millie responds to D’ knowledge. She speaks, ‘I might
need to take some medication to calm my caffeine-induced paranoia. Or maybe
this world that I’m living in was monstrously rigged, and I must somehow
survive by figuring out how I first reacted to… I don’t know, but it seems like
this situation that I’m in happened already once before, and I must figure out
whatever this evil gadget had said in the first place. Let me think… Whatever
action I take right now, was that also predetermined?’”
See the following formal mappings:
I = {x1, x2, …, xn, (xn+1),
(xn+2), … }
O = {y1, y2, …, yn, (yn+1),
(yn+2), …}
xD = xn+1 yD = yn+1
xD’ = xn+2 yD’
= yn+2
… …
The above mappings may develop indefinitely.[7]
All these potentially infinite counterfactual cases are included in Type 3.[8]
Further, it can be said that this type of knowledge is generated by an inherent configuration of the world.[9]
For instance, Tegmark (2008) argues that it is “plausible that our universe
could be simulated by quite a short computer program” (p. 18). Based on the
idea that “our universe is
mathematics” (p. 1), he maintains that its realization only requires storage of
“all the 4-dimensional data” (i.e., all the “[encoded] properties of the
mathematical structure that is our universe”) (p. 18). He states that a
“complete description” of a mathematical structure is “a specification of the
relations between the elements” of the mathematical structure (p. 18). As such,
the 4-dimensional data primarily relate to the abstract realm of mathematics. If
his argument is true, we would not need any type of D knowledge (consisting of
verbal descriptions in atomic-sentential form) to simulate a universe. Rather, D
knowledge would be a byproduct of the mathematical structure and its
specification.
2. The Vantage Point Problem
This section explores how to address the “vantage point
problem” using the concept of D knowledge. Let us first look into two
philosophical cases where this problem has not been properly addressed.
(1) Tegmark[10]
(2008) asserts that “[t]here exists an external physical reality completely
independent of us humans” and that “[o]ur external physical reality is a
mathematical structure” (p. 1). However, despite presenting convincing
arguments, he still fails to address the vantage point problem. In footnote 3
on p. 5, he notices the problem of how a mathematician should derive, through
(i) a mathematical structure alone, (ii) an empirical domain and (iii) “a set
of correspondence rules which link parts of the mathematical structure with
parts of the empirical domain.” He hints at a possibility of achieving this by
introducing a “car” analogy. Specifically, “given an abstract but complete
description of a car (essentially the locations of its atoms),” “someone” that
wants “practical use of this car” might “be able to figure out how the car
works and write her own manual” by “carefully examining the original
description.” Simply put:
“Someone” → Mathematician
Car → Universe
Description of the car → Mathematical structure of the
universe
Practical use of the car → Empirical domain of the universe
Knowledge of how the car works → Correspondence rules linking the
mathematical structure with the empirical domain
While the mathematician is a part of the universe, that “someone”
is not a part of the car. Therefore, the car analogy fails. The analogy would have
been more accurate if the “someone” had a complete description of both herself and the car.[11]
Tegmark’s case is one instance illustrating a common mistake made by scientists
as well as philosophers – namely, the confusion that arises from the vantage
point problem.
(2) Dennett (2003) notes that "confusion [over
determinism] arises when one tries to maintain two perspectives on the universe
at once" (p. 93). One perspective is the "God's eye"
perspective, and the other is the "engaged perspective of an agent within
the universe.” His description of the former perspective coincides with the
Parmenidean view of the universe. He adds that “[f]rom the timeless God's-eye
perspective nothing ever changes," as "the whole history of the
universe is laid out 'at once.'" Dennett appears to give equal weights to
both perspectives but cautions against assuming them at the same time. He does
not provide a philosophical scheme where both perspectives can coexist. Specifically,
he does not reveal how it is possible for the agent within the universe to assert determinism from a provisional God’s-eye
perspective.
The above two cases illustrate the ongoing struggle of
scientists and philosophers to reconcile the discrepancy between a human agent
making a declarative statement (i.e., a deterministic worldview) about the
universe at large and the universe where the agent belongs. It is believed that
this paper has resolved this issue to a certain extent. Unlike machines, human
intelligence is capable of emergently processing -- to use a bit of an oxymoron
-- even “otherworldly but comprehensible” knowledge (i.e., D knowledge).
By definition, D knowledge is an entirety of verbal descriptions encompassing
the whole universe. This type of knowledge is inherently inaccessible;
therefore, it can be considered to exist in an “otherworldly” realm.
Nevertheless, it is deemed “comprehensible” from the human agent’s perspective,
as evidenced by its capacity to provide a non-trivial response to D knowledge.
This has a metaphysical implication that the human agent could potentially view
the universe from a vantage point situated in a realm beyond the universe
despite actually being a part of the universe. However, for machine
intelligence, D knowledge is neither “otherworldly” nor “comprehensible.” In fact,
there is no type of information at all that can be genuinely comprehended by
machine intelligence. This is illustrated through the triviality of responses
it might generate with regard to D knowledge in subsection 2.1.
Further, the same level of triviality could be said to be
exhibited by a hypothetical agent whose declaration of determinism should be
assumed to be inseparable, in a pancomputational[12]
sense, from all the other events of the world. Specifically, in a world without
a qualitative distinction between the two (i.e., espousal of determinism and
the other physical phenomena), the agent (possibly a machine one) would have no
motivation in the first place to assume a higher “vantage point” from which to
view the world. Roughly speaking, in such a world, no scholarly debate on
determinism would have any meaning. If our universe is to be depicted
differently from that world, a determinist’s declaration of determinism should
by necessity stand out by acquiring a particular metaphysical meaning amidst
all the events of the universe. This is achieved by granting a privileged
status to the determinist regardless of the truthfulness of her argument. She deserves
the status because of her inherent capacity to comprehend D knowledge.
Finally, note that this peculiar dynamic between the
determinist’s philosophical mind and the universe can be best described through
a dialectic circle in Maybee (2020, Section 1). Before the determinist decides
on the determinacy of the events of the universe, these events must first be placed
within her scope of thoughts. In other words, they should become the objects of
her speculative investigation. Then, as she declares determinism, she realizes
that the entire process (from her investigation up to the declaration) is also
part of the deterministic scenario of the universe. Subsequently, she concludes
from a transient God’s-eye perspective that every time she declares determinism,
this would have also been predetermined. In hindsight, she realizes that her
conclusion was also predetermined.
The above process continues,[13]
thereby generating the dialectic circle. It expands as the determinist’s mind
and the objects/events of the universe continue to encircle each other in an
alternating manner. This type of circle provides a more nuanced illustration
than the image of “eye” of the “metaphysical subject” encapsulated within “the
field of sight” in Wittgenstein (1922, p. 75), as well as a different image
that one may newly draw by placing the eye outside the field of sight.
3. Conclusion
The main ideas of this paper can be outlined as follows.
(1) Deterministic knowledge
l
Type 1
n
Dictates the world.
n
Includes finite counterfactual cases.
l
Type 2
n
Reflects the world.
n
Includes no counterfactual cases.
l
Type 3
n
Is generated by the world.
n
Includes infinite counterfactual cases.
(2) Deterministic worlds
l
Trivially deterministic world
n
Its agent executes rigid processing.
l
Non-trivially deterministic world
n
Its agent executes emergent processing.
Based on the above conceptual scheme, this paper has
sought to distinguish human from machine intelligence by allowing for hard
determinism. In accordance with this scheme, it attempted to justify a determinist’s assertion
of determinism by placing the determinist within the universe.
However,
this paper may face several challenges from readers. First, one might point out
that the paper relies only on metaphysical speculation and lacks empirical
support. However, many philosophical ideas are inherently speculative, aiming
to look beyond the realm of empirical science. Despite their purely speculative
nature, they can meaningfully influence the empirical world. For instance, this
paper’s framework can be taken as a normative model for human vs. machine intelligence.
Under this model, we can imagine measuring the level of enhancement in a
connectionist-based AI by studying its response to a history of its replica provided
as a certain kind of “D knowledge.”
Second, one
may argue that the “vantage point problem” is not really a problem. She may have
no difficulty accepting the idea that a determinist can describe the universe
from a viewpoint situated within the universe. She can conveniently appeal to
the causality principle to support determinism. However, causality itself does
not tell us very much about her
particular status as an intellectual being. If she conflates herself with
mindless machines in accordance with pancomputationalism, her concern for the
truth of determinism becomes insignificant. Philosophical truths are dead
issues to mechanical beings. What this paper has done is illustrate a subtle
difference between human and machine intelligence by assuming that both adhere
to causality.
Third, one could
suggest that this paper seems to beg the question by assuming from the
beginning that the original and simulated worlds are already different. Indeed,
this is a notable limitation of the paper. Nevertheless, the author believes
that it provided one original instance of a logical possibility where machines fall
short of human intelligence.
This paper has
additional limitations. The conception of D knowledge, for example, may be
deemed questionable by quantum physicists. They argue that describing physical
events through exact spatial/temporal coordinates on the quantum level is
impossible in principle. Additionally, the paper cannot explain the phenomenon
of qualia or a sense of agency and free will. These problems require further
study.
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Verso.
[1]
Vihvelin (2023) proposes “[leaving] open the metaphysical possibility of time
travel to the past” (p. 1). This concept is philosophically worth considering,
even though it is unlikely to materialize in reality. Note that her proposal
implicitly involves the idea of providing D knowledge to an agent in the
past.
[2] We
assume that the cognitive agent receives only a “small breadth” of D knowledge
that is associated with the agent. The entirety of D knowledge would be too
immense to be processed by any agent.
[3] Müller
(2014) indicates that there can be two different physical processes P1
and P2 that perform the same computation C (p. 9). Similarly, the
original and simulated worlds are computationally the same but ultimately
different.
[4] A representation-bearer is a means
through which an object being represented is thought/perceived by an agent. See
Frankish & Ramsey (2012, p. 9).
[5]
Connectionism suggests that “individual neurons do not transmit large amounts
of symbolic information” and that “they compute by being appropriately
connected to large numbers of similar units” (Feldman & Ballard, 1982, p.
208).
[6]
Testing whether a connectionist-based AI could think like humans may require a
different approach like Schneider’s (2019) ACT test (p. 54).”
[7] Similarly, Sterelny (1990) notes that the “ability to
think about the world as it is and as it might be, to think indefinitely many
and indefinitely complex thoughts” may be a “necessary condition on having
intentional states” (p. 29).
[8] When considering the infinite counterfactual cases, we
see that no predefined type of D knowledge (i.e., Type 1) can exist that dictates a non-trivial world.
[9] This
configuration may be unidentifiable as demonstrated in the Kantian antinomies
(Kant, 1998, pp. 470-495).
[10]
Tegmark is a determinist. He supports Einstein’s dictum that “God does not play
dice” (p. 10).
[11] Even
if she had all the information regarding her mind/body as well as the car from
a materialistic viewpoint, she might still fail to explain how her bodily
composition gives rise to consciousness. Even a complete mathematical
formulation of the neural correlates of consciousness may not fully elucidate
its nature. Such an “epistemological limitation” may be a necessary feature of
consciousness, as “the transcendental standpoint is in a sense irreducible, for
one cannot look ‘objectively’ at oneself” (Žižek, 2012, p. 239).
[12]
According to pancomputationalism, “everything is a computing system” and “minds
are computing systems too” (Piccinini, 2007, p. 95).
[13] This
type of infinite progression is believed to be a central feature of philosophy,
as seen in examples such as Kripke’s “Kripkenstein,” Derrida’s “différance,”
the Liar Paradox, and Lao Tzu’s Taoism.
