Paper
1: Metaphysical realm necessitated upon assuming determinism
Paper
2: Vantage point problem in determinism and gravity (Fichtean I’s)
Paper
3: A computing machine designed to declare determinism
“The
treatment of determinism and gravity conflates
epistemic issues (what the subject knows or asserts) with metaphysical truths (what is objectively the case).”
-
Nagel’s “view from nowhere”
-
Fichte’s I
Determinacy
:
both determinism and indetermnism are logical possibilities
: strong causality allowing no other alternate scenario
:strong
causality defines, ahead of the passage of
time, the definiteness of the scenarios
:weak
causality agrees that once events happen, they are set in stone (definite).
: but
it disagrees that we know its full definiteness without time passing.
:weak
causality =indeterminism
:indeterminism would posit that definiteness only coincides
with passage of time.
:
indeterminism can be seen as
(i)
denial of determinism as a metaphysical fact or
(ii)
a metaphysical fact (across time) contradicting determinism
: when
a coin in a box, we know whether it is tails/heads is definite
: determinism
is either correct or wrong only when a metaphysical
realm exists.
:
the hard facts regarding the future scenarios are set in stone since the big
bang.
:
these facts exist whether or not eternalism holds.
:
the emergence of the facts temporally coincide with the origin of the world.
:
but the facts are hierarchically subsequent to the origin.
:
just as in math where a theorem conceptually rests on a lemma.
: the
facts do not dictate the world scenarios.
:
the facts are dictated by the origin (through strong causality).
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The
following expressions are identical:
I
(subject) objectifies myself (object).
I
(subject) am me (object).
I2
(subject) am I1 (object)
I2
(subject) refers to I1 (object).
I2
(subject) makes reference to I1 (object).
I2
(I1+ α) refers to I1. (α, indicating an extension from I1).
:
through α, I2 is an extension from I1.
We
focus on I2 as a particular instance of a subject
that is actively investigating the world, its selves, and so on by targeting
them as objects.
From
a 1st person perspective
: I2
regards I3 as an extension from I1.
From
a 3rd person perspective
: What
is subsequent to I2 is I3’ and not I3.
: I3’
differs from I3 in that I3’ extends from I2 and not I1.
Objectification
of the self from a 1st person perspective
through I2.
I1, X (dummy), I3, I4, I5,
Objectification
of the self from a 3rd person
perspective through I2.
I1, I2, I3', I4', I5’
If
the subject can validly execute, through I2, referentiality to its selves in
the order of I1, I2, I3', I4', I5’, this suggests
: perfect equivalency between the subject and the object
:
that there is no real subject, because there is no separation between the
subject and object.
===================================
The determinist refers1 to:
The determinacy of all the events of the universe
comprising the very event of referring2 to the determinacy of all the events.
a physicist refers3 to:
The omnipresent influence of gravity, which exerts its sway even on
the neuronal activities of the physicist’s brain required
for referring4 to
the omnipresent influence of gravity as well as on all the other events of
the universe.
Both
the (1) determinist and (2) physicist fail to refer to include their respective
I2s within the scope of their assertion.
: We
refer to this failure as a vantage point problem (VPP).
(1) When
I2 asserts determinism, I2 targets I1, I3, I4, I5, … within the scope of
determinism.
:
But from an objective standpoint, determinism applies to I1, I2, I3', I4', I5’.
:
Thus, the subject (I2) fails to picture a definitive scope of selves to which
to apply determinism.
:
When the subject refers to “whatever I’s that I2 will transition to”, the
subject targets I1, I3, I4, I5, …
:
The subject’s enunciation of “whatever I’s that I2 will transition to”
objectively points to I1, I2, I3', I4', I5’.
:
But the subject is unaware of this.
:
This marks a failure of the subject to thoroughly declare determinism.
:
Regarding I2’s past selves, i.e., I1, I0, I(-1), I(-2), … these are definite
from both the 1st and 3rd person perspectives.
:
But the Is that are to unfold after I2 are seen differently from the two
perspectives.
(2)
When I2 asserts omnipresent gravity, I2 includes, within the scope of gravity, the
respective brain states (i.e., B1, B2, B3, B4…) that are supervened on by I1,
I3, I4, I5, …
From
the 1st person perspective
:
gravity applies to
B1
(supervened on by I1),
B3 (supervened
on by I3),
B4
(supervened on by I4), ...
From
the 3rd person
perspective
:
gravity applies to
B1
(supervened on by I1),
B2
(supervened on by I2), ...
B3’
(supervened on by I3’),
B4’
(supervened on by I4’), ...
So
how does the determinism case differ from the gravity case?
:
But gravity applies even when i make inaccurate references to the future I’s
:
When I mistake a soccer ball as a basketball and say that gravity applies to
the “basketball,” i might have been wrong in describing the object but still
correct that gravity applies to the object.
:
gravity influences the brain states on which the mind states supervene.
: I2
might not make accurate references to the future brain states.
:
But it doesn’t change that gravity applies to the subsequent brain states
despite my flawed references to them.
:
But does determinism apply when i make inaccurate references to the future I’s?
: If
i could not make accurate references to the objects to which to apply
determinism, how could I be sure that they are “definite”?
:
Thus, the determinism VPP arouses greater tension than the gravity VPP.
Objectification
of the self from a 1st person perspective
through I2.
I1, X (dummy), I3, I4, I5,
Objectification
of the self from a 3rd person
perspective through I2.
I1, I2, I3', I4', I5’
: I2 (the subject) indicates that an immediately
subsequent I3 (projected by I2) is an extension
from an I (i.e., I1, objectified by I2) enunciating
this sentence.
: Nevertheless,
I2 can correctly refer to I2 as one of the I’s ranging
from I’s birth to death.
-------------------------------------
I =
subject
T =
thought
T2
=> I2 (subject) thinks about I1 (which
thought T1).
T3
=> I3 declares the determinacy of T3 and T4
From
an agential view, the thought of declaring determinism does not yet exist
before the subject actually engages in the declaration.
T2
=> I2 refer to a next thought after the thought (T2) that I2 is thinking
now.
-------------------------------------
I2
refers to the determinacy of all the
Is ranging from the birth of the I to the death of the I
: Do
these I’s involve I2?
:
The I’s after the declaration of determinacy at I2.
:
Whether I2 makes the reference or not, a standpoint outside of the system see
these I’s as static, provided that determinism is metaphysically correct.
-------------------------------------
I2
refers to the indeterminacy of all
the Is ranging from the birth of the I to the death of the I
Indeterminacy
= (i) denial of determinism as a metaphysical fact
-------------------------------------
====================================
Pancomputationalistic
machine (no subject therein)
A
computer program determines whether 1+1=2 is true against 1+1=3. The
hypothetical possibility of 1+1=3 being true does not make it any more significant
that it is considered as a hypothetical possibility.
Likewise,
a machine agent determining whether determinism is true against indeterminism
does not make indeterminism any more significant than it is considered as a
hypothetical possibility.
