McGinn

: Per McGinn, our cognitive architecture may not be able to capture the reducibility of qualia into the microphysical.

: We can only make the following lawful association:

: "Whenever microphysical specification P occurs, experience E occurs." □(P→E) 

: NCC1<=>phenomenal consciousness1 pairing holds nomologically in association.

: Per McGinn, there is a complete naturalistic explanation of how qualia is reducible into the microphysical.  

: "Given microphysical specification P, experience E could not be otherwise, and how to reduce E into P is transparent." □(P→E) ∧ T(E→P)

: For instance, why a particular corresponding wavelength causes the qualia of redness rather than the qualia of yellowness is clearly and transparently understood purely in terms of microphysics.

: For this hypothetical explanation to be comprehensible, this might require that one be able to see/recognize/study how someone else's qualia arises from his physical brain. In other words, a 3rd party's qualia must be as transparent as a physical object from a 3PP perspective.

: Full reductive intelligibility may require symmetrical epistemic access to both phenomenology and physical structure within a unified observational standpoint.

: However, such an investigator might be a hyperbeing cognitively constructed differently than us.

: Then it becomes problematic how to reduce that hyperbeing's experience of the world into the microphysical. It is also questionable whether the microphysical is the bottommost level base layer of the physical world for the hyperbeing.

: The complete naturalistic explanation where qualia is reduced to the microphysical presupposes a possibility of the hyperbeing.

: Since the problem of the hyperbeing potentially causes an infinite regress problem, we rid of the hypothetical naturalistic explanation and stick to the lawful association □(P→E).

: The irreducibility of qualia/phenomenology into the microphysical is inevitable from our epistemic standpoint.

 

 

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Physics

= A discipline explaining the structural relationality of the physical ontology

: Physics only describes the biological foundation for the phenomenological occurrence of retention and intentionality.

: Physics presupposes the retentive foundation and does not explain the retentive/intentional foundation in its transcendental sense.

: Physics objectively reflects the structural reality of the physical ontology by presupposing a hypothetical retentive observer.

: The descriptions of the universe through the equations of physics presuppose a retentive human observer.

: The equations of physics cannot make sense unless we presuppose a possibility of intentionality/retention.

: However, it is possible that the presupposition of the possibility of intentionality/retention is not a metaphysically essential feature of the world.

: Excluding that presupposition of the possibility of intentionality/retention, the world must be mind-independently configured somehow in an epistemically incomprehensible way that would translate into a physically comprehensible upon further assuming a retentive standpoint.

: But that bridging principle between the metaphysical configuration of the world and the physics would be epistemically unknowable.

M -Ω-> ​P

l  M = unknowable metaphysical reality,

l  P = physically intelligible structure,

l  Ω = observer-dependent retentive transformation principle.

Ω itself cannot be physically represented, because physics already presupposes it.

: If denying such a noumenal foundation of the physical reality, we accept that the possibility of retention/intentionality is a metaphysically essential feature, since physics presupposes it.

 

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Qualia

= The what-it-is-likeness of mental experience

: Qualia is a mental experience yet suggests the influence of the otherness (alterity) of the physical on the mental (e.g., perception, tactile senses)

: We do not choose to experience the what-it-is-likeness of redness. The physical presents the experience of redness to our mental.

: Qualia can be reported by a 3rd party, but cannot be directly observed/perceived the way that a physical object can be.

: No language reduces qualia. Language only makes references to qualia. Qualia cannot be fully "understood" unless by "acquaintance."

 

 

The mental

: The mental exhibits retentive relationality

: Performs direct experience (e.g., perception) of the physical and higher order intentionalization ("reasoning" about the "perception" or "reasoning" about the "reasoning" itself)

: The mental may be limited in perceiving the physical, but is unlimited in intentionalizing even fictitious as well as real objects.

 

The physical

= Manifestation of structural relationality for the mental.

: The structural relationality exists whether or not the mental actually exists.

: But the structural relationality is unthinkable unless supposing a hypothetical retentive standpoint.

: What the physical is in itself before being translated into structural relationality by adopting a hypothetical intentional standpoint is unknowable, although it must exist in its own specific relationality.

 

 

Intentionalization

= forming "aboutness" regarding a mental/physical object from a phenomenological standpoint

realistic intentionality=> reference to real objects

fictitious intentionality=>reference to fictitious objects

(1) A POSSIBILITY of intentionality as a transcendental condition

Without a possibility of intentionality, the variables in the equations of physics cannot refer to anything.

(2) An ACTUAL INSTANCE of intentionality as a biological trait

(i) Biological intentionality arises in reaction to repeated qualia.

(ii) Repeated qualia for unification require temporal continuity.

(iii) Qualia → via temporal continuity → Mature Intentionality

: reductive physicalists reduce "aboutness" into brain state’s microphysical organization establishing its lawful correlations with environmental states.

 

 

Retention

= retaining intentionality regarding "a" up to forming intentionality regarding "b" to merge them together into a whole.

: reductive physicalists reduce "retention" into overlapping microphysical state transitions in neural systems that preserve and transform information across short time intervals.

 

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underlying substrate (post-kantian)

 

 

 

 

 

Critical questions

: Reductive physicalism does not explain the irreducibility of phenomenology into physical vocabularies.

: Non-reductive physicalism does not explain how the mental could be epistemically irreducible into the physical if the mental is indeed wholly ontologically grounded in the physical.

: NCC1 ↔ phenomenal consciousness1 holds.

: Per Robert Hanna's psychocentric predicament, even if NCC1 <=> consciousness1 holds absolutely, the intelligibility of this biconditional principle requires consciousness2.

: Meanwhile, NCC2<=> consciousness2.

: So there is no intentionality or metaphysical investigation not corresponding on one on one basis to NCC.

: Even if the pairing holds absolutely, consciousness still cannot be described fully in purely physical terms in principle.

 

 

Underlying Substrate Thesis

= The mental is wholly ontologically grounded in the underlying substrate ("u-substrate"), which manifests as the physical for the mental.

: "The mental is grounded in the physical" ≈ "The mental is grounded in the u-substrate."

: The mental features retentive relationality, while the physical features structural relationality.

: The physical is independent of the mental to the extent that the u-substrate is independent of the mental.

: However, the physical in its representational aspect of the u-substrate is not independent of the mental.

 

Relationality

: Relationality means connectivity among a plurality of individuations.

: The metphaysical relationality of the u-substrate wholly grounds the retentive relationality of the mental.

: Meamwhile, "retentive relationality is grounded in structural relationality of the physical" ≈ "retentive relationality is grounded in the metaphysical relationality."

: delta = "metaphsyical relationality - structural relationality" exists.

: For natural science, the delta don’t exist.

: However, philosophy informs natural science that this might not be the case ontologically.

: The delta can be figured out only through philosophical reasoning.

: We might not be able to discover the delta through empirical studies, because we only have access to the u-substrate in the form of the physical.

: However, since we do not have access to the u-substrate in itself, which is in principle philosophically impossible, to the best of our knoweldge, the thesis that the causal powers of the mental are inherited from the microphyiscal is closest to the objective truth.

 

The physical

: a close approximation to the u-substrate, which manifests in its structural relationality that can be tracked by the retentive relationality of the mental.

 

The mental

: What is generated by the u-substrate and recognizes the u-substrate in the form of the physical.

: That which performs direct experience (e.g., perception) of the physical and higher order intentionalization ("reasoning" about the "perception" or "reasoning" about the "reasoning" itself, or reasoning about the reasoning about an ontologically real/fictitious property)

 

 

 

Intentionalization

= forming "aboutness" regarding a mental/physical object from a standpoint

: We can intentionalize fictitious objects as well as the physically real objects.

: However, the physically real objects differ from the fictitious ones in that they manifest objectively.

 

Retention

= retaining intentionality regarding "a" up to forming intentionality regarding "b" to merge them together into a whole.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ultimate ontology

 

 

 

 

 

Ultimate ontology

= at least an ontology comprising a noumenal substrate (having proto-mental features), which manifests in the form of the physical for the mental, which is contingently generated by the noumenal substrate.

: The thesis that the mental is grounded in the physical is a close approximation to the thesis that the mental is fully grounded in the "noumenal substrate".

: As such, the mental can roughly epistemically access the noumenal substrate.

: Thus, for instance, space and time are not necessarily subjectively constructed features.

: Ultimate ontology is dynamic; it changes from a state without consciousness to a state where consciousness has been generated.

 

 

 Proto-mentality

: Proto-mentality has two features: (1) receptive and (2) generative.

: That the noumenal substrate manifests as the physical to be perceived/intentionalized/reasoned about by the mental shows the receptive feature.

: That the noumenal substrate generates the mental shows the generative feature.

 

The physical

= the total set of dynamically changing manifestations

= what the "noumenal substrate" manifests for the mental as an interface between the "noumenal substrate" and the mental

: Although the physical is in its representational form not independent of the mental (the qualia of redness would not exist without a phenomenal subject having a visual cortex), the ontology of the noumenal substrate is independent of an occurrence of mentality.

: Say we somehow alter the physical brain (some sort of interface between the part of the "noumenal substrate" and our "mental") by injecting chemicals or doing surgical operation. Then our consciousness changes. That we made changes to the physical brain means that we made changes to the portion of the noumenal substrate underlying the physical brain. As such, our inputs to the physical (interface) can be a way to alter the mental (originating from the noumenal substrate). In a sense, the noumenal substrate, via mentality originating from the noumenal substrate, has made changes to the noumenal substrate itself.

 

 

The mental

= That which is generated by the noumenal substrate and for that which the noumenal substrate manifests as the physical

= That which performs first order intentionalization ("perception") of the physical and higher order intentionalization ("reasoning" about the "perception" or "reasoning" about the "reasoning" itself, or reasoning about the reasoning about a property)

 

Intentionalization

= forming "aboutness" regarding a mental/physical object from a higher-level standpoint

 

Relation between the mental and the physical  

While mentality has something in common with the physical, it also has some distinction from the physical.

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: If mentality were totally identical to the physical, how could intentionalization of the physical even take place? They would be totally undistinguishable, and no meaningful higher-level standpoint could be established. The physical is an approximate representation of the noumenal substrate for the mental, and the mental is generated from the noumenal substrate. This suggests that the mental features a higher-level standpoint on the physical, as the physical is partly an interface or "representation" for the mental.

=>Consider Robert Hanna's psychocentric predicament.

It is the case that retention1=neural integration (i.e., retention is reducible into physical neural integration), but understanding this requires retention2.

 

: If mentality were totally different from the physical, how could intentionalization of the physical even take place? The mental would be totally alienated from the physical, being unable to establish any epistemic contact with the physical. They must share something in common. The physical is an approximate representation of the noumenal substrate for the mental, and the mental is generated from the noumenal substrate. This shows an overlap between the two.