1. The incongruent counterparts
2.
Deterministic knowledge
3.
Dennett’s “Derrida-like” interpretation of our intelligence
4.
Movement as an actualization of a metaphysical possibility
5.
Knowledge-in-hindsight for artificial intelligence
6.
Super-relationalism contra special relativity
ABSTRACT
The
purpose of this writing is to provide through extrapolation from Kant’s
incongruent counterparts a new metaphysical framework for a valid distinction
between human intelligence and machine intelligence that finds its root in
conventional functionalism. Under this framework, this writing also analyzes
the implications of both determinism and indeterminism and their relations to
human reason. Moreover, Jacques Derrida’s deconstructionism and Daniel
Dennett’s “trivial” determinism are challenged under the same framework, along
with providing an alternative view that attempts to settle the issue of
absolute/relational space between Newton and Leibniz. Also, after introducing a
peculiar philosophical calculus in accordance with special relativity that ultimately
provides a basis for “non-trivial” determinism, the writing concludes by noting
that Hegelian philosophy is necessarily the latent holistic framework for
scientific investigation regardless of scientists’ awareness of it.
1.
The incongruent counterparts
Immanuel
Kant devised the concept of incongruent counterparts in order to decide on the
issue of absolute/relational space. According to the absolute theory of space,
even if there were only a single body and nothing else, the body could move by
itself. Meanwhile, the relational theory asserts the body could not move at all
because motion can be defined only in relation to other bodies.
Kant,
however, proposes to put aside the element of motion from the issue and argues
as follows. If the relational theory is correct, there can be no difference
between a world where only a right hand exists (“RH world”) and a world where
only a left hand exists (“LH world”).
More
specifically, the physical attributes of the left hand as thought to be by an
imaginary observer whose view is restricted by the LH world cannot be any
different from those of the right hand as thought to be by an imaginary
observer whose view is restricted by the RH world. That is, each world is
restricted by its respective one-world perspective. (A one-world or two-world
perspective is not so much our philosophical view as our physical understanding
of an either world or both worlds.)
However,
this relational view must be wrong since it is obvious from an outsider’s view
(two-world perspective) that these worlds are different. A relationalist’s
response to this argument is that the two-world perspective through which the
two worlds appear distinct can be established only because of the
pre-established existence of the two worlds. Let us specify the following terms
for further discussion.
Absolutism:
The two-world perspective exists prior to the establishment of the two worlds.
Relationalism:
The two-world perspective exists due to the establishment of the two worlds.
Neo-relationalism*: The two-world perspective emerges through
dependence on a relational context of the two worlds, in which case such
emergence (which may be necessary or contingent) was already immanent in the
cosmos.
Let
us posit the following different worlds:
(LH1)
A right hand cannot enter into an (relationalistic) LH world, which does not
allow emergence of the two-world perspective.
(LH2-1)
A right hand can enter into an LH world, and if it does it is perceived no
differently than the existing left hand. This world does not allow emergence of
the two-world perspective and is neither relationalistic nor absolutistic.
(LH2-2)
A right hand can enter into an (relationalistic) LH world, and if it does, the
existing dimension of the LH world is elevated to that of an absolutistic
world, thereby enabling perception or postulation of the right hand. The
two-world perspective emergence was immanent in this world.
(LH2-3)
When the existing dimension of an (relationalistic) LH world is elevated to
that of an absolutistic world, a right hand can enter into and be perceived
differently in the LH world. The two-world perspective emergence was immanent
in this world.
(RH1)
A left hand cannot enter into an (absolutistic) RH world. However, in the RH
world, the existence of a left hand can be postulated whether it exists or not
outside of the RH world. In this world, the two-world perspective holds with no
possibility of its substantiation. Also, the absolutistic characteristic of the
world might have been made possible by the presence of other LH worlds in the
cosmos.
(RH2)
A left hand can enter into an (absolutistic) RH world. Also, in the RH world,
the existence of a left hand can be postulated in advance prior to such entry.
In this world, the two-world perspective holds with a possibility of its
substantiation. Also, the absolutistic characteristic of the world might have
been made possible by the presence of other LH worlds in the cosmos.
2.
Deterministic knowledge
We
can discuss the issue of determinism by assuming two deterministic universes
and analogizing them to two incongruent counterparts.
More
specifically:
(i)
A prototype world as a genuine world like ours
(ii)
An emulation world that represents through functionalism everything that there
is about the prototype world
The
discussion is based on the following definitions.
Deterministic knowledge*(D knowledge): The totality of all the verbal
descriptions of all the past, present, and future events of a deterministic
universe, the metaphysical presence of the said totality being such that it
coincides with every time point of the universe.
Knowledge-in-hindsight*(H knowledge): The totality of all the verbal
descriptions of all the events of a universe ranging from the beginning to a
particular time point, the metaphysical presence of the said totality being
such that it coincides only with the particular time point
Metaphysically open deterministic universe*: A
deterministic universe where there is a metaphysical sense in assuming a case
in which a cognitive agent has access to the D knowledge of the universe.
Metaphysically open indeterministic universe*: A universe for
which no D knowledge exists in principle and whose history is built up only in
the form of H knowledge, the universe being such that there is a metaphysical
sense in assuming a case in which a cognitive agent of the past has access to
the H knowledge of the future.
Let
us assume that the prototype and emulation worlds are metaphysically open
deterministic universes, by considering that it is only when we tolerate a possibility
that the content of D knowledge can enter as an input into the minds of
particular agents in both worlds that the distinction between the two worlds is
revealed.
If
the D knowledge were provided to the prototype world, it would have been received
as a previously unavailable input by a cognitive agent of the world and lead to
the generation of a novel output that is contextually relevant to the world
(that is characterized by RH1 and RH2 and whose duality is tolerated through
metaphysicalism). Such a world is a non-trivially deterministic* world,
in which the D knowledge is causally subsequent deterministic knowledge,
the presence of which is causally subsequent to but temporally coincides with
the origin of the world. This world requires that a metaphysical perspective
from which everything seems decided emerge instantaneously together with the
beginning of the world. Put differently, the D knowledge generated as such is
an earliest possible reflection of everything that was bound to occur. Also, the
immanence of a novel output in response to the D knowledge is established in a
metaphysical sense, although the novel output itself may not have been
predetermined. However, if the D knowledge were also deducible -- as well as
extant through a metaphysical configuration -- through a transcendental
calculus beyond the realm of our universe, this would also indicate the
calculability of the novel output itself, which would point to the metaphysical
presence of another form of D knowledge pertaining to the original D knowledge
and so on.
On
the other hand, if the D knowledge were provided to the emulation world (that
is characterized by LH1 and LH2-1 and whose duality is tolerated through
metaphysicalism) it would have been merely reduced to one of the then
available inputs and lead to a corresponding output. Such a world is a trivially
deterministic* world, in which the D knowledge is causally precedent
deterministic knowledge, the presence of which causally precedes the origin of
the world. That is, this world is that which was constructed by design under
the precedent D knowledge.
The
distinction between subsequent and precedent deterministic knowledge is
important because the conception of precedent D knowledge is implausible in a
metaphysically open, non-trivially deterministic world.
Admittedly,
absorption of D knowledge CANNOT physically occur in either deterministic world
(RH1 or LH1), because by definition it is rigidly deterministic. Therefore, the
distinction should be understood only in a metaphysical sense.
Unfortunately,
to logical positivists and Popperian thinkers, such an idea will sound
outlandish and appear as vacant as the ancient texts of I-Ching. Another
limitation of my proposal is that it does not explain our unconsciousness. The
workings and progress of the human psyche are so complex that it cannot be said
that the only difference between human consciousness and naïvely
functionalistic machine intelligence is that the former has a latent capacity
to creatively interpret an “otherworldly but comprehensible” input and the
latter does not.
(Meanwhile,
“otherworldly and incomprehensible” subject matter may belong in the realm of
Kantian things-in-themselves and be behind emergent phenomena. Metaphysical
knowledge is -- as the “totality of facts” according to Wittgenstein -- simply
an ethereal manifestation of the noumena relative to human reason. We
may justifiably speculate the existence of or even describe the details of
parallel universes through natural science (RH1), but we cannot know anything
about, but can only posit, things-in-themselves themselves.)
3.
Dennett’s “Derrida-like” interpretation of our intelligence
“There
is nothing outside the text.”
The
above quote is from Jacques Derrida, and I think it succinctly shows the mightiness
of language as, arguably, the only means of human thought. Derrida-led
postmodernists may even go so far as to argue that there is no such thing as
“meaning,” and that if there is ever to be such a thing as meaning, it must be
a byproduct of differ”a”nce (cf. relationalism). It is as if signifiers
took precedence over the signifieds. However, common sense tells us that no
language use would be possible in the absence of meaning. When Derrida asserts
that nothing can exist outside the text, he does not know or only
subconsciously knows that meaning exists in relation to the text (cf. neo-relationalism).
To put it in a Zizekian way, Hegelians do not know that they are anti-Hegelians
(in that they are unaware they must break free from dogmatic Hegelianism to be
true Hegelians) and anti-Hegelians do not know that they are Hegelians (in that
they are unaware Deleuze’s neurotic opposition to Hegelianism paradoxically
helps to achieve Hegelianism). If they do, their knowledge is only
subconscious.
To
be sure, my claim that deconstructionist philosophy contradicts itself since it
implicitly operates with the existence of meaning behind it can be deemed
baseless to deconstructionists (cf. LH2-1) since my statement as such could not
have been stated if it were not put into language. This radical view reminds me
of Daniel Dennett in regards to artificial intelligence. According to him, our
mind is no different from a computing machine. Since every conceivable thought
can be represented in a conventionally functionalistic way, there is nothing
about our mind that escapes algorithms. However, he appears to hastily regard
the subsequent constructability of algorithms as proof that the entirety of the
human mind is an algorithmic representation and nothing more.
Also,
when he argues that determinism is necessary in order for our mind to function
properly (because otherwise it would be unclear what it means to have free
will), he believes that the future causal chain of events is also
predetermined, presumably because the events of our past and present appear
rigidly deterministic and their causal connections can be clarified in
hindsight.
However,
that casual order universally applies to our past/present/future does not
necessarily mean that there exists one and only scenario corresponding to them.
Our future events will one day be explicable in accordance with our
causality-latent understanding, but it is in principle impossible to conclude
on the issue of whether the events were predetermined simply based on the
notion of causality, provided that our intelligence is distinct over machines’.
In other words, the presence of knowledge-in-hindsight does not ensure the
presence of deterministic knowledge in general.
In
addition, if our future is rigidly deterministic despite our supposed
distinction from machines, it is not because of the principle of causality but
because of a metaphysical law, which preemptively mirrors, rather than
prescribes, our future decisions.
4.
Movement as an actualization of a metaphysical possibility
The
core point of Zeno’s paradox is that if space is continuous as is assumed by
Einstein’s relativity, there is no immediate subsequent spatial coordinate next
to the origin from which an object departs. However, even if our space and time
is continuous, this may cause no contradiction if a particular metaphysical
assumption is satisfied. That is, if we assume that a metaphysical possibility
of a spatial movement precedes the actual movement and if this is true, the
apparent paradox is resolved. More specifically, what appears to us as a
movement would be from the metaphysical perspective the endless snapshots of an
object in temporally vanishing order that correspond to an infinite number of
respective spatial coordinates that exist within a spatial continuum of a
finite length. It is not like that the object has to pave its way into a realm
of nothingness from the very beginning; rather, the seamless spatial background
for its movement is given in advance. Then, its moving trajectory, whose
possibility exists in the metaphysical realm, is actualized. This is not an
easily graspable idea in an intuitive sense, and that is only natural because
if we were able to sense -- which is impossible in the first place -- every one
of an infinite number of snapshots, we would not be able to think. Perhaps,
provided that spacetime is continuous, it may be that we are able to think at
all because our limited mind omits most of the infinite snapshots in a
heartbeat. Otherwise, we would spiral into an abyss of new emergence of
spatial/temporal coordinates. Therefore, we conclude that our mind thinks (or
our perception functions) by discretizing the continuous flux of time.
To put it in a different way, the one who sees infinite natural numbers at the
same time is not a sentient being.
Also,
one way of resolving the dispute between Newton and Leibniz on
absolute/relational space is to propose that motion exists as a metaphysical
possibility for a single body with respect to other hypothetical objects in an
infinite, vacant universe (cf. neo-relationalism). Although it is
possible to imagine that the body makes a spatial transition from a particular
coordinate to another, no difference can be found between the infinite, vacant universe
before the supposed motion of the lone object and the same universe thereafter.
Therefore, one may sensibly conclude that the single body’s movement is of an
imaginary concept built on our empirical notion of movement in actual space.
Nevertheless, it is not principally whether or not other objects exist that
decides whether the single body can move. Rather, its potential for motion with
respect to the other objects is given in advance, and it is this potential that
enables the motion when they come into existence.
5. Knowledge-in-hindsight
for artificial intelligence
My
theory of deterministic knowledge, which was influenced by Gödel (e.g.,
plugging a Gödel number representing a metamathematical proposition into a
variable of the same metamathematical proposition) and Wittgenstein (e.g., a
metaphysical world as a “totality of facts”), may provide a relevant discourse
with respect to artificial intelligence.
Strong
AI proponents argue that human intelligence is realizable in machines, and I
believe this is possible if we discover a particular electric configuration
that emergent-ly triggers consciousness (LH2-2 and LH2-3).
For
our thought experiment, let us name a particular futuristic AI machine (that
thinks like humans do) “TARS” and assume that this it is still in its infancy
and that all it can do is to think and cannot physically move around yet.
Suppose there are three replicas of the TARS prototype: TARS0, TARS1, and
TARS2. If TARS0 is put in a confined space and provided with only a limited
number of inputs beginning from time point T0 to Tn in a strictly controlled
environment, it will have produced a series of outputs that constitute a
collection of data, which is an approximation of knowledge-in-hindsight
with respect to the remaining TARSs. If such H knowledge is provided to TARS1,
after TARS1 was put in the same strictly controlled environment and received
the same inputs from T0 to Tn, we can expect that TARS1 will take the H
knowledge as a novel input and produce a corresponding novel output. Then, if
we provide TARS2 with the same H knowledge that was received by TARS1, in the
same manner that we provided it to TARS1, will TARS2 produce the exact same
output as TARS1’s? If the two outputs are the same, let us say that this shows
“output consistency,” and if not, let us that it shows “output discrepancy.”
In
a metaphysically open deterministic universe, output consistency might
corroborate the deterministic nature of our thinking process. On the other
hand, output discrepancy might indicate that machine intelligence is
indeterministic at least relative to ourselves. In either case, it can be said
that even our efforts to experimentally determine the nature of a non-trivially
deterministic thought process were determined, albeit not predetermined under
precedent deterministic knowledge. Perhaps Nietzsche was right when he said
that we could willfully practice amor fati despite the fatalistic
courses of our lives. It is in this very world that I believe compatibilism is
possible.
In
a metaphysically open indeterministic universe, output consistency might
indicate that although our thought process is deterministic, it is the
intrinsic indeterminacy of our physical environment that renders our future
indeterministic. On the other hand, output discrepancy might corroborate the
indeterministic nature of our thought process. However, in the case of a
metaphysically closed world, such a thought experiment might have little
meaning.
6.
Super-relationalism contra special relativity
In
order to discuss the implication of special relativity for the concept of knowledge-in-hindsight,
let us suppose a case where “B” is moving at the speed of 260,000 km/sec with
respect to “A,” who is standing still on earth. Then we deduce the following facts:
When
2 sec expires for A from A’s perspective, 1 sec expires for B
from A’s perspective.
When
2 sec expires for A from B’s perspective, 4 sec expires for B
from B’s perspective.
“H
knowledge specific to A in a time period from 0 sec to 2 sec in A’s time frame
as seen by B” = “H knowledge specific to A in a time period from 0 sec
to 2 sec in A’s time frame as seen by A”
“H
knowledge specific to A from 0 sec to 2 sec in A’s time frame as seen by A” is
not the same as “H knowledge specific to A from 0 sec to 4 sec in A’s time
frame as seen by A”
“The
totality of H knowledge that pertains to both A and B in a time period from 0
sec to 2 sec in A’s time frame as seen by A”
=
(H knowledge specific to B from 0 sec to 1 sec in B’s time frame as seen by B)
+
(H
knowledge specific to A from 0 sec to 2 sec in A’s time frame as seen by A) +
(H
knowledge specific to B from 1 sec to 4 sec in B’s time frame as seen by B) +
(H
knowledge specific to A from 2 sec to 8 sec in A’s time frame as seen by A) +…
Based on the above knowledge-in-hindsight calculus
under special relativity, we conclude that a time lapse from t=0 to t=2 entails
the generation of deterministic knowledge in general. However, the time lapse
does not necessarily have to be that of 2 seconds. It can be a duration of any
seconds or even an infinitesimal second. As such, special relativity appears to
be in harmony with the conception of a non-trivially deterministic universe that
requires that deterministic knowledge emerge instantaneously along with the
beginning of time, supposing that special relativity has been a consistently
correct law of physics since the Big Bang.
The current atmosphere of the scientific community
is dominated by beliefs in the absence of free will on the basis of
well-established arguments for a causal view of the universe. However, one of
the most radical ideas about determinism comes from quantum mechanics: Bell’s
superdeterminism. Since this view considers every incident of our universe as
having been predetermined (perhaps even prior to the beginning of the universe),
it appears unclear if there is any significant difference between a physicist’s
experimental action and such a trivial physical occurrence as the blowing of
the wind or an act of reading this writing. My response to this issue is that
it is only through philosophy that the difference is revealed.
Super-relationalism*: A philosophical perspective emerges as an
immanent part of the universe in relation to its non-philosophical characteristics
if the universe is constructed to allow its emergence, the philosophical
perspective identifying itself as being part of the universe in a recursive
manner through a perspective over itself and another perspective over the
perspective and so on, thereby generating a super-relationalistic context and
“nowness” for our consciousness.
The above concept is “but a footnote to Hegel.”
When the alleged feminist philosopher Lao Tzu
enunciated “xuán (black) zhī (proceed) yòu (more) xuán
(black),” he was not alluding to what the French people call “trous noir (black
hole).” Rather, he was more likely characterizing the noumena as becoming ever
more mysterious as one delved into it. This property of the noumena, Hegel
suggests, is a reflection of our reason.
It is natural for physicists to pay little
attention to Hegel unless they have a penchant for philosophy. However, some of
them hastily conclude that “philosophy is dead,” while not recognizing the
position that they thereby put themselves in. For instance, they do not appear
to realize that superdeterminism necessitates, rather than conveniently disposes
of, philosophy so as to be considered an object of our speculative
investigation. A world governed by superdeterminism that is truly devoid of a
naturally arising philosophical perspective does not seek to prove
superdeterminism. Superdeterminism (which is questionable) has meaning only
when we legitimize ourselves as higher-level observers of the concept (perhaps
through employing the notion of “retro-causality”) despite paradoxically seeing
ourselves as part of the rigidly predefined universe. Hence, in response to the
skeptical scientists, we may speak:
Philosophy makes no contribution to natural
science; it is only a necessary feature of the intelligence of our species.
Accordingly, through the successive steps of
philosophical reasoning that departed from Kant’s incongruent counterparts to
end in Hegel (and start anew therefrom), we conclude that a
non-super-relationalistic world is a dead world where no intellectual discourse
has any meaning.
Written by WesternLight Snacker’s (taoprep.blogspot.com)
* 6. Super-relationalism contra special relativity is based on a flawed understanding of special relativity.
