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1. If the universe is deterministic, deterministic
knowledge (hereinafter, “D knowledge”) exists.
1.1 The D knowledge exists in comprehensible
form.
1.11 Even if there are imperceivable phenomena, the
D knowledge need not include descriptions on what cannot be verbalized.
1.12 The D knowledge may relate to imperceivable
phenomena only in a way that the imperceivables relate to our perceivables.
1.20 Nonetheless, the D knowledge cannot be
reached by the human mind.
1.21 Access to D knowledge is logically impossible,
on the grounds of self-reference paradox and diagonal argument.
1.22 Thus, determinism cannot mean that all the
events are calculable simply because they are predetermined.
1.23 A genuinely meaningful form of the D
knowledge may be accessible, if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) The deterministic universe belongs in a
larger cosmos;
(ii) Injection of the diagonal knowledge of the
deterministic universe into the universe from the cosmos is indeterminately possible;
and
(iii) The event of the injection occurs and the
D knowledge becomes accessible to the human mind.
1.3 Nevertheless, the accessed D knowledge is no
longer valid as D knowledge and transforms into mere descriptions on what could
have occurred otherwise.
1.4 Thus, it is impossible for a human agent to
ascertain the determinacy of the universe through the D knowledge.
2. An
indeterministic universe is such that every time it begins from the same cause,
it may unfold according to a different scenario than before.
2.1 A
deterministic universe and an indeterministic universe share one thing in
common: It is only through the passage of time that a human agent belonging in
either universe is able to identify the scenario of the universe up to a
particular time point.
2.11 The
principal difference between the two is that D knowledge exists for the former
but not for the latter.
2.111 The D knowledge exists in
comprehensible form for us but is available only to those that can cross the
time axis of our universe at will or to a transcendental being who holds the
script of the scenario.
2.2 An indeterministic universe,
however, “constructs” its scenario successively through the passage of time.
3. Therefore, whether our
universe is predetermined or not matters only from a viewpoint that can be established
in the outside of our universe.
3.1 However, if there is nothing
outside of the universe, this issue can matter to no one.
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Table of Contents
1. Defining Determinism
2. Law of Cause and Effect
3. Deterministic Knowledge
4. Indeterministic Universe
5. Conclusion
*[Wittgenstein’s Eye and Hegelianism]
*[Metaconsciousness]
*[Nietzsche’s Amor Fati Thought Experiment]
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1. [Defining Determinism]
Whatever we suppose to be the totality of propositions,
statements about this totality generate new propositions which, on pain of
contradiction, must lie outside the totality. It is useless to enlarge the
totality, for that equally enlarges the scope of statements about the totality.
Hence there must be no totality of propositions, and “all propositions” must be
a meaningless phrase.
– Bertrand Russell
Simply put, determinism is based
on the following notion:
“All the past events of the
universe couldn’t have happened otherwise and the upcoming events will occur
exactly as they should and will never happen otherwise.”
It doesn’t matter whether the
events are conceivable in our minds. I will take a stance that there is a realm
of physical phenomena that take place objectively and independently, irrespective
of the existence of the human mind that perceives them.
This stance is based upon the
following two categories of events:
1. Events/laws that cannot be
reached by the human mind either through scientific/philosophical speculation
or observation but meaningfully affect the perceivable events and our
consciousness; these events are non-verbalizable.
2. Perceivable events/laws (which
may have to be distorted to be perceived by us as in the case of quantum
mechanics)
However, on top of these two
categories, I will also add:
3. Events of our consciousness
Concerning the 1st case, I will
state that these types of events are only hypothetical.
The 3rd case is more subtle,
because it suggests that our consciousness may belong in a separate realm from
that of physical phenomena. No conclusion has been definitively made yet on
whether our consciousness is totally reducible into physics.
In addition, by the “events” of
our consciousness, I refer to feelings or thought processes taking place in our
brain.
2. [Law of Cause and Effect]
The law of cause and effect is
the usual ground of an argument for determinism. However, I would say that it
requires a leap of faith to reach a
conclusion that everything (perhaps excluding the very first single cause of
the universe, i.e., Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover) in our universe has a cause that
lead to its inevitable existence in its form as we know it or will know it.
By the principle of induction, we can effectively argue
that something is a cause of an event if the cause repeatedly leads to our
expected result. However, if one adopts David Hume’s perspective, there is no
way of knowing whether everything in our universe has its cause as its one and
only necessary cause. Verified revelation of particular causes in Newtonian
physics or Einstein’s theory does not guarantee that all the three types of
events – i.e., both perceivable/imperceivable events and the events of our
consciousness – are also rigidly based on the law of cause and effect.
Furthermore, even if a particular
event may have a preceding cause that necessarily lead to its emergence, it
cannot be known whether we can definitively identify the cause in itself. (Note the 1st category of events under the
section titled “Defining Determinism.”) For example, when we are applying a
particular model or theory to certain phenomena (e.g., applying evolutionary
biology to every human behavior), we might be committing an error of hindsight
bias. An explanatory model is certainly necessary as a provisional depiction of
the phenomena that we observe. Nevertheless, every model will have its basic
inherent limitations, because it is through our distortion of the phenomena
that we can simplify, reduce, and handle them in our hands.
Furthermore, it cannot be said
that it is necessarily the case that, for every transition from a particular
event (a cause) to a subsequent event (a result), there absolutely exists a
corresponding universal law (of physics, for example) that underlies such a
transition. Simply put, it might have been destined that, in a particular
instance, an event A should lead to event B as if in a film script; however,
there may be no generally applicable law
that anticipates this chain of events in this particular instance. The point
being: in certain cases, it may be impossible to deduce even B from event A
even though this chain of events unfolds according to a deterministic scenario
because there may be a priori no
generalized law of the universe that anticipates it. Based on this assumption,
it can be said that several causal links between events are observed only in
hindsight – that is, according to the passage of time.
In a nutshell:
1. It is uncertain whether the
cause-and-effect rule applies to every event of our universe.
2. A cause of an event may be of
such a nature that cannot be grasped in itself by the human mind.
3. There may be a deterministic
chain of events that is not calculable (i.e., unpredictable).
3. [Deterministic Knowledge]
Assumption 1: The cause and
effect principle applies rigidly to every event of the universe except for its
first cause (e.g., the Big Bang).
Assumption 2: There are only two types of events in our
universe: Perceivable physical phenomena and the events of our consciousness.
Assumption 3: Every chain of
events is calculable.
Assumption 3 is posited by contradicting
the 3rd point under “In a nutshell” in “Law of Cause and Effect.” That is,
every event is in principle calculable. Based on these assumptions, it is
deduced that there should necessarily
exist “deterministic knowledge” that can be, in principle, deduced by the
human mind. In addition, I define deterministic knowledge as follows:
Deterministic Knowledge:
The totality of all the
descriptions of all the past, present, and future events of the universe
I posit the following proposition:
P (the universe is deterministic)
=> Q (deterministic knowledge exists)
If the deterministic knowledge
(hereinafter, “D knowledge”) is accessible, we should be able to understand it
because it includes the “descriptions” of all the conceivable events of our
universe. That is, there is no description in the D knowledge that we cannot
understand. However, this leads to several problems. For example, we may ask
the following question:
“Does the D knowledge remain
“intact” even after we access it? That is, is the D knowledge that we are
accessing the same D knowledge that there was prior to our access to its
content?”
The D knowledge may not exist in
tangible form (e.g., a vast collection of books in an immensely huge library or
a wide electronic screen of a gigantic iPad). However, the D knowledge does
exist as an abstract “entity” of facts.
For instance, the laws of physics may not be tangible, but they are established
facts that exist independently of the college textbooks that describe them.
Admittedly, it is unrealistic to
expect that our technology will ever unravel the D knowledge. However, it is
still possible to contemplate the logical consequences of assuming that humans
have access to the D knowledge, because such an assumption is not logically
impossible.
The above underlined question can
be rephrased as follows: To recognize the descriptions narrated by the D
knowledge is in itself an event that apparently is not included in but should
have already been stated in the D knowledge.
Upon a closer look, it appears
that this paradox is closely related to the infinite regress of (1) self-reference. To assume the whole
content of the D knowledge for a finite duration of time – the very act of
“assuming” having to be, in principle, included in the scenario of the D
knowledge – is like to attempt to squeeze a totality into one of its parts. This
is akin to the Cretan liar paradox, i.e., “This sentence is false” = “This
sentence.” Let us delve into this resemblance further.
Cretan paradox:
S= “This
sentence is false.”
(1) S is false.
(that is, S is not true)
(2) “S is false”
is false. (that is, S is true)
(3) S is false
is false is false. (that is, S is not true)
… (ad
inifinitum)
Deterministic
Universe:
(each capital
letter represents a particular event.)
QWERTYUIOP…X[=event of accessing
D knowledge]…ASDFGHJKL
QWERTYUIOP…X[=event of accessing
[QWERTYUIOP…X…ASDFGHJKL]]…ASDFGHJKL
… (ad
inifinitum)
If we try to bypass the “D
knowledge” paradox by assuming the case where we only partially access the D
knowledge or cut out significant portions of the D knowledge that generate this
self-reference paradox, we would have to admit that we can have only limited
knowledge of the D knowledge or have “actively” rendered the D knowledge
incomplete.
This paradox can also be
understood by employing a somewhat (2)
adaptive version of Cantor’s diagonal argument. Say we can nevertheless
access the D knowledge and that this “accessed” D knowledge is genuine. Then,
this would generate “diagonal” D knowledge that is different from the original
D knowledge. Say we further access this diagonal D knowledge. Then we would
thereby create diagonal-diagonal D knowledge that we yet have to subsume. (This
diagonal generation is very similar to an ongoing progress of consciousness.) Meanwhile,
if we assume that we can access D knowledge without generating any diagonal D
knowledge (hereinafter, “diag D knowledge”), it would be that the D knowledge
provided to us is a complete void. That is, no meaningful knowledge can be made
of the D knowledge unless we taint it by accessing it.
(*Again, I emphasize, we should
note that there may be no such diagonal D knowledge in the first place. If
diag. D knowledge is a type of D knowledge, it means that the very first D knowledge
we accessed hadn’t been D knowledge at all from the very beginning.)
In the above, I wrote that the
idea of Cantor’s diagonal argument can be used for refuting the belief that
deterministic knowledge is accessible even if it may actually exist. However,
one should wonder how it is possible to access the genuine form of D knowledge
in the first place, because if determinism is true it is logically impossible
to include our access to D knowledge as an actual “event” in the totality of
the events of our consciousness in the universe. There may be one way this is
possible.
1. Suppose that our deterministic
universe belongs in a larger “cosmos.”
2. Suppose that it is possible to
inject the D knowledge of our universe from the cosmos into our universe.
3. Suppose that the above event
of injection is indeterminate.
If the event of injection occurs,
the D knowledge becomes accessible to us as a set of meaningful descriptions of
how the universe could have been if
we had not accessed the D knowledge.
Furthermore, the D knowledge
loses its place as an absolutistic set of descriptions of our universe. It is noteworthy
that the D knowledge of our universe does not comprise any statement on a
potential event of injection of itself into our universe. That is, the D
knowledge includes no “if” statement. However, if the information on the
potential injection of the D knowledge into the deterministic universe was “available”
to the D knowledge, the D knowledge would have been structured differently.
As such, our access to
deterministic knowledge is enabled only by introduction of an indeterministic
factor from a larger realm beyond.
I contend that it is clear by now
that the three assumptions of this section need revision.
We can block this paradox by changing assumption
2 or 3 or both.
For example, we can change only assumption 3 by stating that NOT every chain of events is
calculable. By adopting such a particular set of axioms for a model of a
deterministic universe, we are able to posit the existence of D knowledge
(i.e., the universe is deterministic) that does exist in comprehensible form
but can never enter into the realm of our understanding (which reminds us of
the Platonic realm). This “transcendental” D knowledge is, however, distinct
from Kantian things-in-themselves or Plato’s Idea, because the former
perspective posits a realm that is beyond human understanding and the latter
position suggests that we can reach Idea through reason.
How do we know that the D
knowledge still exists despite the incalculability of some of the chains of
events? As noted earlier discussing the law of cause and effect, some of the
phenomena may occur according to a strictly predetermined script but may not be
subject to any generalizable law (at least from the human perspective). If we
have generalizable laws that govern every event of our universe, this means
that the universe is calculable.
Another way of rendering the D
knowledge unreachable would be to change assumption
2 by adding “imperceivable phenomena” to the types of events in our
deterministic universe. We thereby make
D knowledge unreachable on our own. Note, however, that the D knowledge will
still exist. Suppose that imperceivable event A causes a perceivable transition from perceivable
event B into perceivable event C. Though we will never figure out the existence
of imperceivable event A, the D knowledge will show us – if we can access it –
that event C was “caused” by event B. The D knowledge only has to include
perceivable events and scenarios. Say imperceivable event A causes an
imperceivable transition from imperceivable event A to B. This has no meaning
to the human mind and is thus excluded from the D knowledge. In this way, we
can dismiss the imperceivable events of the universe.
However, the D
knowledge in the case of modified assumption 2 is different from the D
knowledge in the case of modified assumption 3, because the former D knowledge is
only a subset of the unreachable holistic scenario of the universe while the
latter D knowledge represents the totality of the universe.
In conclusion, by changing one or
two of the original assumptions, we can completely either obliterate the very
logical possibility of the D knowledge seeping into our consciousness.
In a nutshell:
If the universe is deterministic,
at least one of the two following propositions is true: That there are
imperceivable phenomena and that meaningfully affect perceivable phenomena; and
that not every event of the universe is calculable.
4. [Indeterministic Universe]
A universe that newly repeats the
same scenario beginning from the same first cause (e.g., Aristotle’s Unmoved
Mover or the Big Bang) is not an indeterministic universe; that is, it is a
deterministic universe.
Therefore, we can define an
indeterministic universe as follows:
An indeterministic universe is
such that every time it begins from the same cause, it may unfold according to
a different scenario than before.
Both a deterministic universe and
an indeterministic universe share one thing in common. It is only through the
passage of time that a human agent belonging in either universe is able to
identify the scenario of the universe up to a particular time point. The only principal
difference between the two is that D knowledge exists for the former but not
for the latter.
In a deterministic universe,
everything is dictated by the D knowledge according to which the scenario of
the universe unfolds; however, the D knowledge is outside of the deterministic
universe. The D knowledge exists in comprehensible form for us but is available
only to those that can cross the time axis of our universe at will or to a transcendental
being who holds the script of the scenario.
An indeterministic universe,
however, “constructs” its scenario successively through the passage of time.
5. [Conclusion]
As noted above, in a
deterministic universe, we have no way of knowing the future unless the future
actually arrives. Existence of the D knowledge does not ensure that a human
agent belonging in the universe can get to it. Nor can we ever know whether the
universe is deterministic. That being the case, to the human mind, an
indeterministic universe is no different from a deterministic universe. Whether
the universe that is deterministic or not, it is only by looking into the past
and present in hindsight that we gain knowledge of what it has become. I do not
mean to suggest that it justifies the viewpoint of compatibilism. (In fact, a
deterministic universe and an indeterministic universe are very different, but
only from a bird’s-eye point of view.) I instead argue that the only
justifiable position is an agnostic viewpoint with regard to the in/determinism
controversy.
Whether our universe is
predetermined or not matters only from a viewpoint from the outside of our
universe. However, if there is nothing outside of the universe, this issue can
matter to no one.
* [Wittgenstein’s Eye and
Hegelianism]
Let me digress to an interesting viewpoint from Wittgenstein,
who provided the following diagram:
<Excerpt from Tractatus Logico Philosophicus>
What Wittgenstein is saying is that the philosophical subject I
contemplating the affairs of the universe should be independent of the
universe.
From a Hegelian perspective, it can be said that the
metaphysical “eye” in the above illustration alternates between stepping in and
stepping out of the universe; that only this perpetual duality is what
constitutes the interdependent relationship between the metaphysical self and
the universe as an object of our observation. Or it can also be said that as
soon as the metaphysical subject objectifies the universe and declares a
statement on the universe, the metaphysical subject is fossilized and
encapsulated by a bigger universe which is to be objectified yet again by a
somewhat different metaphysical subject at a subsequent time point. A subject
that ceases to be trapped in this Cretan-liar-paradox type of infinite
alterations between two opposite attributes (that is,
true->false->true->false->true->false….. ∞ or
subject->object->subject->object…∞ ) wouldn’t probably be an intelligent being. In order to truly “understand”
this Hegelian line of reasoning, there should be a leap from this
self-contradicting description to the level of knowing, which is similar to the
case where Wittgenstein urged us to throw away the ladder after reading his
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. Because this leap’s existence cannot be
formalized and begs the reader to get to it on his own, I will say that this
likely indicates “emergent” property of our consciousness.
* [Metaconsciousness]
Supposing that God gave us a book containing sufficiently clear verbal
descriptions of the present moment as well as our immediate future (i.e., the D
knowledge) so as to prove that even our metaconsciousness was determined, it
would be natural to conclude that the speed of our perception required for
understanding the verbal descriptions would drastically slow down, because it
is not allowed for our metaconsciousness to “precede” our thoughts foretold
through the descriptions; for to happen otherwise would contradict the law of
determinism. (Just as in the case of Einstein’s theory of relativity.) In fact,
our brain process that enables a critical examiner’s evaluation of God’s
demonstration should “coincide” with our understanding of the verbal
descriptions so that neither could precede the other. This matching
relationship is precisely like that between two parallel continuous (not
discrete) horizontal lines extending from the same vertical coordinate with exactly
the same speed.
It is doubtful whether the above “coincidence” would even be possible,
because I’m not sure how this “oneness” can be achieved between our perception
of the descriptions and the metaconsciousness (remember Lacan’s quote: “There
is no sexual relationship.”). Spinoza once said that the mind and the body are
parallel expressions of the one underlying reality; however, within the head of
a single agent, there can be no parallel between consciousness and its
subsequent metaconsciousness. Rather, they are only in a serial relationship.
In relation to the parallel line analogy, to see why there won’t be such a
“parallel line” relationship in our reality, let us consider the following
situation:
“a particular state of consciousness in which the agent understands the
proof demonstrating the determinacy of the said particular state”
The above condition incurs:
a particular state of consciousness in which the agent understands the
proof demonstrating the determinacy of the particular state of consciousness in
which the agent understands the proof demonstrating the determinacy of the
particular state of consciousness in which the agent understands the proof
demonstrating the determinacy of the particular state of consciousness in which
the agent understands the proof demonstrating the determinacy of……. (ad
infinitum)
In regard to the above, it has to be said that the agent would not be able
to affirm the determinacy of his metaconsciousness either at a fixed time point
or in eternity. Rather, the only feasible case would be where the agent lets go
of its attempt to prove its determinacy and chooses to land on a particular
level of metaconsciousness that he decides not to question any further. For an
illustration of this case, let us look into the following case:
(1) PERCEPTION OF EVENT (at time point t1)
e.g., God foretells the future event of “metaconsciousness(1)”
(2) CONSCIOUSNESS (at t2)
(3) METACONSCIOUSNESS(1) (at t3)
(4) METACONSCIOUSNESS(2) (at t4)
e.g., realizes that “metaconsciousness(1)” really occurred.
<FLOW CHART 1>
From the viewpoint of an agent whose brain process is undergoing the above
sequence of thoughts, the only way to collectively contemplate the whole
sequence is to transition to the subsequent time point, t5.
In order for there to be a separate consciousness that perceives the whole
series (from t1 to t4) exactly at t4, there should be a separate thinking
entity. That is, it is impossible for the primary agent to collectively look
upon the chain of thoughts at t4.
- Is self-reference genuinely possible?
:SELF REFERENCE IS POSSIBLE ONLY WHERE TIME CEASES TO EXIST.
Suppose God nevertheless doesn’t want to stop trying, and He wants to
achieve the status of self-referentiality in the human agent’s consciousness. I
can think of one provisional way that would be possible. Suppose that God makes
the following scenario come true:
PERCEPTION OF EVENT (at time point t1) =>
CONSCIOUSNESS (at t2) =>
METACONSCIOUSNESS(2) (at t3)
<FLOW CHART 2>
In the above flow chart, note that “metaconsciousness(2)” is in the place
where “metaconsciousness(1)” should belong. If God’s omnipotence allows the
consciousness to skip “metaconsciousness(1)” and fast forward to
“metaconsciousness(2),” which is therefore experienced at t3, this case may be
similar to the “state of consciousness in which the agent understands the
proof demonstrating the determinacy of the said particular state.” However,
“metaconsciousness(2)” (hereinafter, “M2”) is dependent upon
“metaconsciousness(1)” (hereinafter, “M1”) in God’s eyes. If flow chart 2 is
achieved in reality, that means there is a lapse (or a disconnect) in the human
agent’s consciousness. In other words, the agent “time-travels” and thereby
achieves self-reference. However, it is questionable whether this genuinely
achieves self-reference. Even if it were possible to place M2 in where M1
should exist, it wouldn’t change the fact that, from the meta-perspective, that
M2 can exist only because of M1. Let us look into the self-referential
definition of consciousness again.
[state of consciousness in which the agent understands the proof
demonstrating the determinacy of the said particular state]
If M2 were put in the place where M1 (alpha) should have been and if that
really achieves self-reference, it might also be suggested that the content of
M2 (at t3) in flow chart 2 is identical to the content of M1 (alpha), because
M1 (beta) is originally supposed to mean a state of metaconsciousness that the
agent was meant to be in. In other words, M2(at t3) = M1(beta). However, M2
(either at t3 or at t4) is by definition different from M1 (alpha). This causes
a contradiction. This contradiction is removed only when we treat the two “M1”s
(namely, alpha and beta) differently. That is, the world where God substitutes
M1 with M2 as in flow chart 2 should be a different world
from the world of flow chart 1. To reiterate, the world where M1 (beta) exists
is different from the world where M1 (alpha) exists. This can perhaps explain
the occurrence of déjà vu.
Therefore, it is concluded that genuine self-reference is impossible,
because while it is possible to create two worlds whereby self-reference is
apparently possible, it is impossible to achieve self-reference exactly in one
world.
Say we still want to believe that self-reference is possible in one world.
How could that be achieved? If the speed of transition from the time point of
M1 to that of M2 is “infinitely” high, t3 would be virtually identical to t4.
In that case, the self-reference of consciousness may be achieved virtually at
the same time point (just as two people talking through Time Division Duplex in
telecommunications don’t realize that they are taking alternate turns).
However, I argue that our consciousness is unable to achieve it in an ideal
sense, based on both scientific and philosophical grounds. First, it
contradicts Einstein. Second, our consciousness should perish into nothing in
order to achieve an ideal state of self-referentiality. Infinitely high speed
means no lapse in time. In other words, there is no flow of time, which means
that there is no consciousness.
In the critique of pure reason, Kant famously said that time exists
because our mind is constructed to view the universe in terms of it. That is,
according to Kant, time does not exist independently of our mind. Time exists
because of our consciousness, and vice versa. If we adopt this view of Kant’s,
we can say that our consciousness and the D knowledge progress in parallel.
That is, consciousness is dictated by but also dictates the D knowledge.
* [Nietzsche’s Amor Fati Thought Experiment]
All my life has been a combat between freedom
and necessity, between my desire to be God and the necessity of remaining a
worm, although a worm with shining wings. My romanticism has been my agony –
which is the agony of my age, which seeks to transcend itself, and falls into the pit of doom and
despair – the dusty anguish of Obermann and Amiel buried alive in the
skepticism of the century.
- “My Sister and I”
“Upwards: - in spite of the spirit that drew it
downwards, towards the abyss, the spirit of gravity, my devil and archenemy.”
“And with tears in his eyes he shall ask you for a
dance and I myself will sing a song for his dance: a dancing and mocking song on
the spirit of gravity...”
- “Also Sprach
Zarathustra”
Note the word “gravity.” The pull of gravity is so
powerful that any attempt to escape its influence is essentially meaningless.
You can only expect to hop several times off the ground and the gravity will
never set you free. Nevertheless, the existentialist Nietzsche never stops
dancing. He may be dragged down again and again but continues to reaffirm his
will to life through the constancy of his fights. In this respect, this dancing
described by Zarathustra is a tearful moral victory. The fate is so much more
powerful than you are, which is the reason why any Schopenhauerian pessimists
will stop resisting and sigh in helplessness. However, for Nietzsche, it was
precisely his finitude in front of the fate that added greater aesthetic,
poetic beauty to his bloody ongoing fight against it. Nietzsche’s superman is a
superman not because he can exercise some supernatural talent or power to fend
off the mighty fate. Rather, it is the continuation of his fight that makes him
a superman; he carries on despite his awareness of his smallness.
Likewise, a practitioner of amor fati may be a puppet whose movements are controlled by the
determined laws of the universe, but he remains a distinct existentialist of
character in his spirit.
