Rethinking
Human and Machine Intelligence through Kant’s Incongruent Counterparts
Abstract
This paper proposes a metaphysical
framework for distinguishing between human and machine intelligence. By drawing
an analogy from Kant’s incongruent counterparts, it posits two identical deterministic
worlds -- one comprising a human agent and the other comprising a machine
agent. These agents exhibit different types of information processing mechanisms
despite their apparent sameness in a causal sense. By postulating the
distinctiveness of human over machine intelligence, this paper resolves what it
refers to as “the vantage point problem” – namely, how to legitimize a determinist’s
assertion of determinism by placing the determinist within the universe.
Keywords:
determinism; incongruent counterparts; simulation; state description;
counterfactuals
Introduction
This paper
was motivated by asking questions about the concept of amor fati (or “love of fate”) (Nietzsche, 1990, p. 99). This philosophy of life has inspired
many of Nietzsche’s readers seeking guidance in life. However, his advice seems
to have certain inconsistencies. For instance, how can someone learn to embrace
fate if everything in her life has been predetermined? If determinism is true,
would it not be accurate to say that even an act of learning to love her fate
was also predetermined? Was Nietzsche himself, perhaps, predestined to encourage
his readers to love their fate?
When a
determinist asserts that the universe is deterministic, this requires assuming
a hypothetical vantage point from which to describe the universe. At first
sight, it seems reasonable to say that such a vantage point should be located
somewhere beyond the universe. For instance, Wittgenstein (1922) notes that
“the philosophical I” is a “metaphysical subject” that is “not a part of the
world” (p. 75). Determinism is a philosophical judgment imposed upon the world.
Accordingly, the determinist’s reasoning mind may have to be separated from the
world. However, the determinist herself is a part of the world. According to Danielsson
(2023), since “[w]e cannot stand outside the world,” “we always look at the
world from the only vantage point that exists: from within. (Chapter 1)”
The above
peculiar relationship between the two (i.e., the determinist vs. universe) can
cause confusion. The determinist is a finite being located within space and
time. Then, how could she justify the significance of her assertion of
determinism, which is a view that seems to require attainment of a God’s-eye
perspective? This issue will be referred to as the “vantage point problem” in
this paper.
To address
the problem, this paper proposes to discuss two different types of
deterministic worlds by using Kant’s “incongruent counterparts” (hereinafter,
“ICs”) as an analogy. Admittedly, the use of Kant’s ICs may seem far-fetched,
since his original purpose was to resolve an absolute versus relational space
controversy. However, this concept is used for analogical reasoning only; it is
not meant to provide direct insights into the issue at hand. If readers
patiently follow this paper’s arguments to the end, they will see how it
establishes a plausible model that allows a determinist to validly claim our
universe as deterministic while remaining a part of it.
1. The Incongruent
Counterparts
Kant
devised the concept of ICs to address the issue of absolute versus relational
space (Kant, 1994, pp. 145-174). According to the theory of absolute space,
even if the universe had only one body and nothing else, that body would still
have a spatial background in which it could move (Asher, 1987, p. 447).
However, the relational view of space denies the existence of absolute space and
defines motion only in relation to other bodies.
Kant develops
his argument by discussing the left hand and right hand. Specifically, the left
hand observed from a perspective restricted to the property of the left hand
would be no different from the right hand observed from a perspective
restricted to the property of the right hand. However, their difference is
apparent “when both are considered in relation to some appropriate third thing”
(Remnant, 1963, p. 393). In other words, they are revealed to have different
orientations from an external perspective embedded in absolute space.
However,
the aim of this paper is to use the IC analogy as a speculative tool for
discussing the nature of determinism in relation to human reasoning. To achieve
this, by building upon Kant’s concept, this paper assumes a world where only a
left hand exists (an “LH” world) and another world where only a right hand
exists (an “RH” world). Specifically, it posits the following cases.
LH1:
A right hand cannot enter into the LH world. Also, the right hand is
inconceivable in the LH world.
LH2:
A right hand can enter into the LH world, and if it does, it will be perceived
no differently than the existing left hand.
RH1:
A left hand cannot enter into the RH world. Nevertheless, its attributes can be
hypothesized in the RH world.
RH2:
A left hand can enter into the RH world. Also, the RH world can hypothesize the
attributes of the left hand before such entry takes place.
These
cases will be mentioned again for analogical reasoning in subsections 2.1 and
2.2
2. Deterministic
Knowledge
This paper
will use the following key definitions:
(1) Deterministic knowledge (D
knowledge): A totality of facts associated with all the past, present, and
future events in a deterministic world.
(2) Deterministic world: A
world where events are deterministic. There is metaphysical significance in considering
a case of providing D knowledge to a cognitive agent of this world.[1]
Definition
(1) is
similar to Carnap’s (1947) “one state-description” (he notes that this idea was
inspired by Wittgenstein) (p. 10). Specifically, it “describes the actual state
of the universe” and “contains all true atomic sentences and the negations of
those which are false” (p. 10). However, Carnap primarily devised this concept in
relation to a semantical system for linguistic analysis. Meanwhile, D knowledge
relates to descriptions of a deterministic world. In this regard, these two notions
are different. Nevertheless, following Carnap, we will assume that D knowledge
is an entirety of atomic sentences that describe a deterministic world.
Definition
(2) introduces a seemingly contradictory idea. If D knowledge were provided to
the agent, it suggests that she could gain knowledge about her future. However,
if she did attain such knowledge, the D knowledge would no longer be valid
because it fails to describe one particular event: her attainment of the
knowledge. To address this apparent contradiction, this paper will examine reception
of D knowledge in a metaphysical
sense only.[2]
Now let us
define two deterministic worlds that are established as “ICs.”
(i) An
original world like ours that comprises a human agent.
(ii) A
simulated world that replicates every aspect of the original world and comprises
a machine agent emulating the human agent in a causal manner.[3]
According
to Schwartz (2012), determinism is the view “that [possible] worlds cannot be
the same up to a point and then diverge” (p. 216). However, in our thought experiment,
it is possible that the deterministic
worlds (i) and (ii) are computationally identical up to a particular point and
then diverge when D knowledge is provided to them. If one contends that the
human mind cannot be fully reduced to an algorithm, it becomes necessary to
assume that such a divergence is possible.
For
further discussion, this paper will use concepts of computationalism to
investigate the characteristics of information processing exhibited by both
agents. According to Beraldo-de-Araújio, the essence of
computation is “symbolic manipulation” and concerns “mapping function between
two sets of symbols” (Polak & Krzanowski, 2019, p. 6). The human agent’s
symbolic manipulation, for instance, may take place through neural activities
in the brain. Meanwhile, the machine agent performs symbolic manipulation by
processing machine-readable symbols. By slightly changing Beraldo-de-Araújio’s
definitions on p.6, this paper defines computation as follows.
(a) A
process is a function P: I → O such that its domain I is a set whose elements
are called input events and its co-domain
O is a set whose elements are called output events,
while both I and O are subsets of a physical world. For all x∈I, y = P(x) (y∈O) is a corresponding output
event.
(b) A
computer is a function C: S → T from a set of input symbols S to a set of output symbols
T, such that C(x̅) is outputted by computing x̅. (x̅ is a symbolic
representation of x.) A process P: I → O is computational if P is generated by
a computer C.
In
the simulated world, we suppose that the mind is a “classical von Neumann
computer” and that “its representation-bearers [are] data structures” (Frankish & Ramsey, 2012, pp. 31-32).[4]
This world is intentionally designed to avoid being based on a “connectionist”
model.[5]
Specifically, it may not be feasible for the connectionist model to accurately
emulate the human agent due to its highly stochastic nature.[6]
Such a feature might hinder accurate realization of a scripted scenario. Although
the classical model may be much less sophisticated, it can at least robustly
emulate human behaviors in hindsight if all the relevant information is
available.
2.1 Type 1
If the D
knowledge specific to the simulated world were provided to its agent, the agent
would process reception of the D knowledge simply as one of the existing
potential input events. This suggests that the agent executes rigid processing,
as it cannot process in any other way an input that it was not configured to
receive. This world is trivially
deterministic in that it is governed by a predefined type of D knowledge
(i.e., Type 1) that dictates how
things should occur.
Through
the IC analogy, the simulated world can be physically characterized by “LH1.”
Recall that a right hand cannot enter into an LH world. Similarly, D knowledge should
not be provided to the simulated world in order to retain its status as a
totality of descriptions of the world. Additionally, the simulated world can be
metaphysically characterized by “LH2.” If a right hand does enter
into the LH world, it will be perceived no differently than the existing left
hand. Likewise, even if D knowledge is provided to the simulated world, its
provision would not be identified by its agent as distinct from all the other
existing potential input events.
See the
following mappings.
I = {x1,
x2, …, xn}
O = {y1,
y2, …, yn}
Since this
is a trivially deterministic world, only one of the input events from x1
to xn is to occur. The pairs other than the actual input-output pair
serve to illustrate counterfactual cases. These cases are included in Type-1 D
knowledge. Now suppose that reception of D knowledge occurs immediately before
a particular event in the input event set does. Then:
xD
= xk (xD is reduced to xk.) 1 ≤ k ≤ n
xD
= Reception of D knowledge
yD
= yk
yD
= A response to reception of D knowledge
However,
the above mappings are based on a non-stochastic model, which does not allow
for indeterminacy. By supposing for now that the simulated world is
indeterministic, we can establish the following mappings.
I = {x1,
x2, …, xn}
O = {y1[1],
…, y1[s1]}, {y2[1], …, y2[s2]}, …, {yn[1],
…, yn[sn]}
xD
= xk (xD is reduced to xk.) 1 ≤ k ≤ n
yD
= One element from {yk[1], …, yk[sk]} (The probabilities
assigned to these stochastic outcomes add up to 1.)
The above
stochastic model is meant to show that, even in an indeterministic world, as
long as the agent relies on rigid processing, its response to reception of the
D knowledge could be nothing other than any one of the predefined output events.
To
illustrate the triviality of the simulated world, let us consider a hypothetical
scenario involving a clinical psychologist named “Millicent” (or simply “Millie”).
She loves coffee but often hesitates whether to drink it. One morning, she
decides to have a coffee anyway while watching a seminar video through a tablet
device. In this case, suppose that there is a 60% chance that she will stop
drinking her coffee if she happens to think that it will do her no good. The
following event mappings are
established for her in atomic-sentential form:
x1
= The seminar tires me.
x2
= The coffee does not convince me of insomnia.
x3
= The coffee convinces me of insomnia.
y1
= I stop watching.
y2
= I keep drinking.
y31
= I stop drinking.
y32
= I keep drinking.
However,
since the world is deterministic, only a particular event such as x1
(which does not allow a stochastic outcome) would have been configured to
occur. Meanwhile, in a metaphysical sense, it is possible to assume that
specific descriptions in the D knowledge could be provided to her immediately
before x1 happens. Suppose that her tablet displays not only the
above mappings but also a short history of her activities in the morning and
the events to unfold throughout the day. How would she respond?
From a
humanistic perspective, there must be a distinct mental representation
corresponding to the event of “I see the descriptions.” However, Millie’s rigid
processing mechanism would only be able to interpret the sight of the display
as one of x̅1 to x̅3. Recall that Millie’s mind follows
the classical computer model whose representation-bearers are data structures.
Since she only executes rigid processing, a bit structure corresponding to her
symbolic representation of the event would most probably be translated to a
particular bit structure corresponding to one of x̅1 to x̅3.
Suppose that it is interpreted as x̅3. Then, her processing
mechanism would output either one of y̅31 and y̅32. Given
the 60% chance, it would probably output y̅31, which should be accompanied
by y31. In other words, she would probably stop drinking her coffee
in response to receiving the D knowledge.
2.2 Type 2
If the D
knowledge specific to the original world were provided to its agent, the agent
would process reception of the D knowledge as a different input event than all
the other previous potential input events. This means that the agent’s processing
mechanism exhibits emergent processing, as it can distinctly identify a
particular input event that was not supposed to happen. This world is non-trivially deterministic. Using the
IC analogy, it can be physically characterized by “RH1” and
metaphysically by “RH2.” Further,
it is possible (rather than necessary) that the D knowledge only reflects every physical event across
time. Unlike Type 1, this type of D knowledge (namely, Type 2) does NOT include
counterfactual cases. Also, this knowledge is compatible with the block
universe theory.
In the block universe model, “[w]hether
past, present or future, all events ‘lie frozen’ in the four-dimensional block,
much like the scenes from a movie are fixed on the film roll” (Thyssen, 2020,
p. 6). If one were to see the events of the universe like fixed scenes on a
film roll from an omniscient viewpoint across time, she might be able to
extrapolate to a certain extent counterfactual cases in relation to those
events. However, the scenes themselves do not include such information. In that
sense, Type-2 D knowledge only mirrors the physical events.
Meanwhile,
we assume that emergence of a new output in response to D knowledge reception is
necessary, considering that the
agent’s processing mechanism is assumed to be governed by causality. However, the content of the new output may be deterministic or non-deterministic.
This is highlighted by the question mark in the input-output mappings below.
The pairs other than the actual input-output pair are provided as dummies whose
contents are unknown (which means that the counterfactual cases are unknown). “xn+1”
(i.e., reception of D knowledge) is enclosed in parentheses to indicate that it
is only a latent event in a
metaphysical sense.
I = {x1,
x2, …, xn,(xn+1)}
O = {y1,
y2, …, yn, (?)}
xD
= xn+1 yD
= ?
If the Millie
scenario happened in the original world, she might have been struck to the core
and asked, “Am I living in a Matrix?” by emergently interpreting her reception of
D knowledge.
2.3 Type 3
Despite
its assertion that the past, present, and future all coexist, the block
universe theory does not demand absolute causality. Polkinghorne (2007) notes
that “[b]elievers in the block universe are not forced to commit themselves to
a deterministic account of its causal structure” (p. 977). However, assume that
the original world is thoroughly deterministic in a causal sense. Then, one can entertain the idea that its agent’s
decision-making processes are strictly deterministic in a metaphysical as well
as physical sense. Specifically, the agent should produce a new output (whose
content is deterministic) in response to receiving D knowledge of Type 2. This hypothetical
situation would generate a derivative version of D knowledge (namely, D’).
Then, the agent should produce another output in response to receiving D’,
thereby generating another derivative version of D knowledge (namely, D’’). To
aid in understanding this somewhat complex scenario, let us go back to the
Millie story. With regard to the Millie of the original world, D’ knowledge
might state as follows:
“Millie
responds to D knowledge. She speaks, “Am I living in a Matrix?”
D’’
knowledge might state:
“Millie
responds to D’ knowledge. She speaks, ‘I might need to take some medication to
calm my caffeine-induced paranoia. Or maybe this world that I’m living in was
monstrously rigged, and I must somehow survive by figuring out how I first
reacted to… I don’t know, but it seems like this situation that I’m in happened
already once before, and I must figure out whatever this evil gadget had said in
the first place. Let me think… Whatever action I take right now, was that also
predetermined?’”
See the
following formal mappings:
I = {x1,
x2, …, xn, (xn+1), (xn+2), … }
O = {y1,
y2, …, yn, (yn+1), (yn+2), …}
xD
= xn+1 yD
= yn+1
xD’
= xn+2 yD’ = yn+2
… …
The above
mappings may develop indefinitely.[7]
All these potentially infinite counterfactual cases are included in Type 3.[8]
Further, it can be said that this type of knowledge is generated by an inherent configuration of the world.[9]
For instance, Tegmark (2008) argues that it is “plausible that our universe
could be simulated by quite a short computer program” (p. 18). Based on the
idea that “our universe is
mathematics” (p. 1), he maintains that its realization only requires storage of
“all the 4-dimensional data” (i.e., all the “[encoded] properties of the
mathematical structure that is our universe”) (p. 18). He states that a
“complete description” of a mathematical structure is “a specification of the
relations between the elements” of the mathematical structure (p. 18). As such,
the 4-dimensional data primarily relate to the abstract realm of mathematics. If
his argument is true, we would not need any type of D knowledge (consisting of
verbal descriptions in atomic-sentential form) in order to simulate a universe.
Rather, D knowledge would be a byproduct of the mathematical structure and its
specification.
3. The
Vantage Point Problem
This
section explores how the “vantage point problem” stated in this paper’s
introduction can be addressed by relying on the concept of D knowledge. Let us
first look into two philosophical cases where this problem has not been
properly addressed.
(1)
Tegmark[10]
(2008) asserts that “[t]here exists an external physical reality completely
independent of us humans” and that “[o]ur external physical reality is a
mathematical structure (p. 1). However, despite presenting convincing
arguments, he still fails to address the vantage point problem. In footnote 3
on p. 5, he notices the problem of how a mathematician should derive, through
(i) a mathematical structure alone, (ii) an empirical domain and (iii) “a set
of correspondence rules which link parts of the mathematical structure with
parts of the empirical domain.” He hints at a possibility of achieving this by
introducing a “car” analogy. Specifically, “given an abstract but complete
description of a car (essentially the locations of its atoms),” “someone” that
wants “practical use of this car” might “be able to figure out how the car
works and write her own manual” by “carefully examining the original
description.” Put simply:
“Someone” → Mathematician
Car → Universe
Description
of the car →
Mathematical structure of the universe
Practical
use of the car → Empirical domain of the universe
Knowledge
of how the car works → Correspondence rules linking the mathematical structure
with the empirical domain
While the
mathematician is a part of the universe, that “someone” is not a part of the
car. Therefore, the car analogy fails. The analogy would have been more
accurate if the “someone” had a complete description of both herself and the car.[11]
Tegmark’s case is one instance illustrating a common mistake made by scientists
as well as philosophers – namely, the confusion that arises from the vantage
point problem.
(2) Dennett
(2003) notes that "confusion [over determinism] arises when one tries to
maintain two perspectives on the universe at once" (p. 93). One
perspective is the "God's eye" perspective, and the other is the
"engaged perspective of an agent within the universe.” His description of
the former perspective coincides with the Parmenidean view of the universe. He
adds that “[f]rom the timeless God's-eye perspective nothing ever changes,"
as "the whole history of the universe is laid out 'at once.'" Dennett
appears to give equal weights to both perspectives but cautions against
assuming them at the same time. He does not provide a philosophical scheme
where both perspectives can coexist. Specifically, he does not reveal how it is
possible for the agent within the
universe to assert determinism from a provisional God’s-eye perspective.
The above two
cases illustrate the ongoing struggle of scientists and philosophers to
reconcile the discrepancy between a human agent making a declarative statement
(i.e., a deterministic worldview) about the universe at large and the universe
where the agent belongs. It is believed that this paper has resolved this issue
to a certain extent. Unlike machines, human intelligence is capable of emergently
processing -- to use a bit of an oxymoron -- even “otherworldly but comprehensible” knowledge
(i.e., D knowledge). By definition, D knowledge is an entirety of verbal
descriptions encompassing the whole universe. This type of knowledge is
inherently inaccessible; therefore, it can be considered to exist in an “otherworldly”
realm. Nevertheless, it is deemed “comprehensible” from the human agent’s
perspective, as evidenced by its capacity to provide a non-trivial response to
D knowledge. This has a metaphysical implication that the human agent could
potentially view the universe from a vantage point situated in a realm beyond
the universe despite actually being a part of the universe. However, for
machine intelligence, D knowledge is neither “otherworldly” nor “comprehensible.”
In fact, there is no type of information at all that can be genuinely
comprehended by machine intelligence. This is illustrated through the triviality
of responses it might generate with regard to D knowledge in subsection 2.1.
Further,
the same level of triviality could be said to be exhibited by a hypothetical
agent whose declaration of determinism should be assumed to be inseparable, in
a pancomputational[12]
sense, from all the other events of the world. Specifically, in a world without
a qualitative distinction between the two (i.e., espousal of determinism and
the other physical phenomena), the agent (possibly a machine agent) would have
no motivation in the first place to assume a higher “vantage point” from which
to view the world. Roughly speaking, in such a world, no scholarly debate on
determinism would have any meaning. If our universe is to be depicted
differently from that world, a determinist’s declaration of determinism should
by necessity stand out by acquiring a particular metaphysical meaning amidst
all the events of the universe. This is achieved by granting a privileged
status to the determinist regardless of the truthfulness of her argument. She
can be granted such a status because of her inherent capacity to comprehend D
knowledge.
Finally,
note that this peculiar dynamic between the determinist’s philosophical mind
and the universe can be best described through a dialectic circle in Maybee (2020,
Section 1). Before the determinist decides on the determinacy of the events of
the universe, these events must first be placed within her scope of thoughts.
In other words, they should become the objects of her speculative
investigation. Then, as she declares determinism, she realizes that the entire
process (from her investigation up to the declaration) is also part of the
deterministic scenario of the universe. Subsequently, she concludes from a
transient God’s-eye perspective that every time she declares determinism, this
would have also been predetermined. In hindsight, she realizes that her conclusion
was also predetermined.
The above
process continues,[13]
thereby generating the dialectic circle. It expands as the determinist’s mind
and the objects/events of the universe continue to encircle each other in an
alternating manner. This type of circle provides a more nuanced illustration
than the image of “eye” of the “metaphysical subject” encapsulated within “the
field of sight” in Wittgenstein (1922, p. 75), as well as a different image
that one may newly draw by placing the eye outside the field of sight.
4.
Conclusion
The main
ideas of this paper can be outlined as follows.
(1)
Deterministic knowledge
l Type
1
n Dictates the
world.
n Includes
finite counterfactual cases.
l Type
2
n Reflects the
world.
n Includes
no counterfactual cases.
l Type
3
n Is
generated by the world.
n Includes
infinite counterfactual cases.
(2) Deterministic
worlds
l Trivially
deterministic world
n Its
agent executes rigid processing.
l Non-trivially
deterministic world
n Its
agent executes emergent processing.
Based on the above conceptual scheme, this paper has
sought to distinguish human from machine intelligence by allowing for hard
determinism. In accordance with this scheme, it attempted to justify a determinist’s assertion
of determinism by placing the determinist within the universe.
However,
this paper may face several challenges from readers. First, one might point out
that the paper relies only on metaphysical speculation and lacks empirical
support. However, many philosophical ideas are inherently speculative, aiming
to look beyond the realm of empirical science. Despite their purely speculative
nature, they can meaningfully influence the empirical world. For instance, this
paper’s framework can be taken as a normative model for human vs. machine
intelligence. Under this model, we can imagine measuring the level of
enhancement in a connectionist-based AI by studying its response to a history
of its replica provided as a certain kind of “D knowledge.”
Second, one
may argue that the “vantage point problem” is not really a problem. She may have
no difficulty accepting the idea that a determinist can describe the universe
from a viewpoint situated within the universe. She can conveniently appeal to
the causality principle to support determinism. However, causality itself does
not tell us very much about her
particular status as an intellectual being. If she conflates herself with mindless
machines in accordance with pancomputationalism, her concern for the truth of
determinism becomes insignificant. Philosophical truths are dead issues to
mechanical beings. What this paper has done is illustrate a subtle difference
between human and machine intelligence by assuming that both adhere to causality.
Third, one could
suggest that this paper seems to beg the question, by assuming from the
beginning that the original and simulated worlds are already different. Indeed,
this is a notable limitation of the paper. Nevertheless, the author believes
that it provided one original instance of a logical possibility where machines fall
short of human intelligence. The author would be satisfied if even a single
reader finds intellectual stimulation in the paper’s argumentation.
This paper has additional limitations. The conception of D knowledge, for example, may be deemed questionable by quantum physicists. They argue that describing physical events through exact spatial/temporal coordinates on the quantum level is impossible in principle. Additionally, the paper cannot explain the phenomenon of qualia or a sense of agency and free will. These problems require further study.
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Sterelny, K. (1990). The representational
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Tegmark, M. (2008). The Mathematical
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Thyssen, P. The Block Universe: A
Philosophical Investigation in Four Dimensions. Doctoral dissertation, KU
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Vihvelin, K. (2023). Determinism,
Counterfactuals, and the Possibility of Time Travel. Philosophies, 8, 68.
https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8040068
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Žižek, S. (2012). Less Than Nothing: Hegel
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[1]
Vihvelin (2023) proposes “[leaving] open the metaphysical possibility of time
travel to the past and backwards causation” (p. 1). This concept is
philosophically worth considering, even though it is unlikely to materialize in
reality. Note that her proposal implicitly involves the idea of providing D
knowledge to an agent in the past.
[2] We
assume that the cognitive agent receives only a “small breadth” of D knowledge
that is associated with the agent. The entirety of D knowledge would be too
immense to be processed by any agent.
[3]
Müller (2014) indicates that there can be two different physical
processes P1 and P2 that perform the same computation C
(p. 9). Similarly, the original and simulated worlds are computationally the
same but ultimately different.
[4] A representation-bearer is a means
through which an object being represented is thought/perceived by an agent. See
Frankish & Ramsey (2012, p. 9).
[5]
Connectionism suggests that “individual neurons do not transmit large amounts
of symbolic information” and that “they compute by being appropriately
connected to large numbers of similar units” (Feldman & Ballard, 1982, p.
208).
[6] Testing
whether a connectionist-based AI could think like humans may require a
different approach like Schneider’s (2019) ACT test (p. 54).”
[7] Similarly, Sterelny (1990) notes that the “ability to
think about the world as it is and as it might be, to think indefinitely many
and indefinitely complex thoughts” may be a “necessary condition on having
intentional states” (p. 29).
[8] When considering the infinite counterfactual cases, we
see that there can be no predefined type of D knowledge (i.e., Type 1)
that dictates a
non-trivial world.
[9]
This configuration may be unidentifiable as demonstrated in the Kantian
antinomies (Kant, 1998, pp. 470-495).
[10]
Tegmark is a determinist. He supports Einstein’s dictum that “God does not play
dice” (p. 10).
[11] Even if she had all
the information regarding her mind/body as well as the car from a materialistic
viewpoint, she might still fail to explain how her bodily composition gives
rise to consciousness. Even a complete mathematical formulation of the neural
correlates of consciousness may not fully elucidate its nature. Such an
“epistemological limitation” may be a necessary condition for consciousness, as
“the transcendental standpoint is in a sense irreducible, for one cannot look
‘objectively’ at oneself” (Žižek, 2012, p. 239).
[12] According to
pancomputationalism, “everything is a computing system” and “minds are
computing systems too” (Piccinini, 2007, p. 95).
[13] This type of infinite
progression is believed to be a central feature of philosophy, as seen in
examples such as Kripke’s “Kripkenstein,” Derrida’s “différance,” the Liar
Paradox, and Lao Tzu’s Taoism.
