Pinned Answer
Amor fati means “love of fate.”
Nietzsche wrote that he does not want his life to be different either backwards
or forwards. Because we are only thrown into fate, which occurs out of its own
volition and not ours, it can be said that we are only free in terms of being
able to choose our attitudes to fate (which is similar to Stoicism).
Nietzsche’s response was to accept unconditionally everything that occurs in
life. He said that even if this would recur in eternity, he would indeed wish
it to happen over and over again. (Read Albert Camus’ The Myth of
Sisyphus, if you are more interested.)
However, aside from the above normative
interpretation of Nietzsche’s amor fati, I would like to approach this issue a
little differently by adding my personal thoughts concerning determinism. For
the sake of discussion, I will limit my argument to the case of “hardcore
determinism.”
- Questioning determinism
Nietzsche’s idea of eternal
recurrence is based on the notion of determinism. However, how do we
prove that our fate is determined? Contemporary scientists and
philosophers argue that we have no alternatives in the scope of choices in life
and that it is illusory to think that we make choices through our exercise of
free will. However, I have a good reason to believe that the argument for
absolute determinism is bound to fail on a priori grounds.
It is possible that determinism
may be true. As a thought experiment, suppose that God exists and that He has
deterministic knowledge of our universe. If He wants to demonstrate that our
universe is determined and that therefore all our lives’ affairs and even the
thoughts that we make in our brains were also predetermined, God can provide us
with every piece of information concerning every conceivable event in our lives
– that also includes our states of consciousness.
However, when God does show us
particular events will occur in our lives and we come to realize that his
prophecy was true, what does it say about the state of our consciousness that
recognizes this truth of determinism? More specifically, could it be asked
whether the very state of consciousness needed for realizing in our mind the
determinacy of the universe was also predetermined or bound to occur as a
combination of biochemical interactions in our brain? If this particular state
of consciousness was also predetermined, which part of our mind should also
recognize that that state of consciousness also abides by the rule of
determinacy? In other words, if God foretold us that we would realize the truth
of determinism at a particular time point in future, thereby indicating to us a
future state of our consciousness with regard to our “epiphany,” how do we
prove that a new state of our consciousness, i.e., meta-consciousness, for
realizing the said state of our consciousness for realization of determinism
was also predetermined? In order to know that our meta-consciousness was also predetermined,
we would have to have meta-metaconsciousness to see that the
“meta-consciousness” was predetermined. Because this chain of
meta-consciousness’s is like a never-ending infinite regress, we have to stop
at some point and fixate on a particular level of meta-consciousness that
accepts the truth of determinism. Therefore, in order to conclude based on
God’s demonstration that the universe is deterministic, there should be a
particular level of meta-consciousness that is independent of the deterministic
system where we belong. By inductive reasoning, we can reasonably believe that
the universe is determined because God correctly predicts our future events,
but we cannot prove whether our meta-consciousness was also
predetermined. It is only by excluding this particular level of
meta-consciousness from the deterministic universe that we as human agents can
conclude that the universe is deterministic. In other words, it is
impossible in principle to prove solidly to a human
agent that everything is determined unless he is allowed the freedom of
meta-consciousness to escape the deterministic system of the universe. In the
eyes of God, it is all clear that our meta-consciousness is determined.
However, to the human agent, it is unproven.
In a nutshell:
We cannot prove to
ourselves that our particular level of meta-consciousness that
perceives/understands the demonstration of determinacy was predetermined.
Rather, we only “know.” 」
- Thought experiment on
demonstration of absolute determinism
Supposing that God gave us a book
containing sufficiently clear verbal descriptions of the present moment as well
as our immediate future so as to prove that even our metaconsciousness was
determined, it would be natural to conclude that the speed of our perception required
for understanding the verbal descriptions would drastically slow down, because
it is not allowed for our metaconsciousness to “precede” our thoughts foretold
through the descriptions; for to happen otherwise would contradict the law of
determinism. (Just as in the case of Einstein’s theory of relativity.) In fact,
our brain process that enables a critical examiner’s evaluation of God’s
demonstration should “coincide” with our understanding of the verbal
descriptions so that neither could precede the other. This matching
relationship is precisely like that between two parallel continuous (not
discrete) horizontal lines extending from the same vertical coordinate with
exactly the same speed.
It is doubtful whether the above
“coincidence” would even be possible, because I’m not sure how this “oneness”
can be achieved between our perception of the descriptions and the
metaconsciousness (remember Lacan’s quote: “There is no sexual relationship.”).
Spinoza once said that the mind and the body are parallel expressions of the
one underlying reality; however, within the head of a single agent, there can
be no parallel between consciousness and its subsequent metaconsciousness.
Rather, they are only in a serial relationship.
In relation to the parallel line
analogy, to see why there won’t be such a “parallel line” relationship in our
reality, let us consider the following situation:
“a particular state of
consciousness in which the agent understands the proof demonstrating the
determinacy of the said particular state”
The above condition incurs:
a particular state of
consciousness in which the agent understands the proof demonstrating the
determinacy of the particular state of consciousness in which the agent
understands the proof demonstrating the determinacy of the particular state of
consciousness in which the agent understands the proof demonstrating the
determinacy of the particular state of consciousness in which the agent
understands the proof demonstrating the determinacy of……. (ad infinitum)
This case resembles the Cretan
liar paradox. Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness
theorems also make use of the liar paradox or Richardian paradox. However,
there is a limitation to the application of Gödel’s theorem to the above case,
because the theorem is applicable to none other than mathematics. Still, it is
possible to attempt analogical reasoning. One common feature between the two
cases is that they use the notion of a meta-system/meta-language. However,
there is a major difference.
To my knowledge, Gödel argued that the
Gödelian sentence “G=G is unprovable” is proved to be true by meta-language.
However, “a particular state of consciousness in which the agent
understands the proof demonstrating the determinacy of the said particular
state” cannot exist either in an agent’s head or God’s view of the
agent’s consciousness chain. This stipulation is simply absurd and has no truth
value either in a deterministic system or in meta-view of the deterministic system.
In other words, there is no “state of consciousness in which the agent
understands the proof demonstrating the determinacy of the said particular
state.”
In regard to the above, it has to
be said that the agent would not be able to affirm the determinacy of his
metaconsciousness either at a fixed time point or in eternity. Rather, the only
feasible case would be where the agent lets go of its attempt to prove its
determinacy and chooses to land on a particular level of metaconsciousness that
he decides not to question any further. For an illustration of this case, let
us look into the following case:
(1) PERCEPTION OF EVENT (at time
point t1)
e.g., God foretells the future
event of “metaconsciousness(1)”
(2) CONSCIOUSNESS (at t2)
(3) METACONSCIOUSNESS(1) (at t3)
(4) METACONSCIOUSNESS(2) (at t4)
e.g., realizes that
“metaconsciousness(1)” really occurred.
<FLOW CHART 1>
From the viewpoint of an agent
whose brain process is undergoing the above sequence of thoughts, the only way
to collectively contemplate the whole sequence is to transition to the
subsequent time point, t5.
In order for there to be a
separate consciousness that perceives the whole series (from t1 to t4) exactly
at t4, there should be a separate thinking entity. That is, it is impossible
for the primary agent to collectively look upon the chain of thoughts at t4.
- Is self-reference genuinely
possible?
:SELF REFERENCE IS POSSIBLE ONLY
WHERE TIME CEASES TO EXIST.
Suppose God nevertheless doesn’t
want to stop trying, and He wants to achieve the status of self-referentiality
in the human agent’s consciousness. I can think of one provisional way that
would be possible. Suppose that God makes the following scenario come true:
PERCEPTION OF EVENT (at time
point t1) =>
CONSCIOUSNESS (at t2) =>
METACONSCIOUSNESS(2) (at t3)
<FLOW CHART 2>
In the above flow chart, note
that “metaconsciousness(2)” is in the place where “metaconsciousness(1)” should
belong. If God’s omnipotence allows the consciousness to skip
“metaconsciousness(1)” and fast forward to “metaconsciousness(2),” which is
therefore experienced at t3, this case may be similar to the “state of
consciousness in which the agent understands the proof demonstrating the
determinacy of the said particular state.” However, “metaconsciousness(2)”
(hereinafter, “M2”) is dependent upon “metaconsciousness(1)” (hereinafter,
“M1”) in God’s eyes. If flow chart 2 is achieved in reality, that means there
is a lapse (or a disconnect) in the human agent’s consciousness. In other
words, the agent “time-travels” and thereby achieves self-reference. However,
it is questionable whether this genuinely achieves self-reference. Even if it
were possible to place M2 in where M1 should exist, it wouldn’t change the fact
that, from the meta-perspective, that M2 can exist only because of M1. Let us
look into the self-referential definition of consciousness again.
[state of consciousness in which
the agent understands the proof demonstrating the determinacy of the said
particular state]
If M2 were put in the place where
M1 (alpha) should have been and if that really achieves self-reference, it
might also be suggested that the content of M2 (at t3) in flow chart 2 is
identical to the content of M1 (alpha), because M1 (beta) is originally
supposed to mean a state of metaconsciousness that the agent was meant to be
in. In other words, M2(at t3) = M1(beta). However, M2 (either at t3 or at t4)
is by definition different from M1 (alpha). This causes a contradiction. This
contradiction is removed only when we treat the two “M1”s (namely, alpha and
beta) differently. That is, the world where God substitutes M1 with M2 as in
flow chart 2 should be a different world from the world
of flow chart 1. To reiterate, the world where M1 (beta) exists is different
from the world where M1 (alpha) exists. This can perhaps explain the occurrence
of déjà vu.
Therefore, it is concluded that
genuine self-reference is impossible, because while it is possible to create
two worlds whereby self-reference is apparently possible, it is impossible to
achieve self-reference exactly in one world.
Say we still want to believe that
self-reference is possible in one world. How could that be achieved? If the
speed of transition from the time point of M1 to that of M2 is “infinitely”
high, t3 would be virtually identical to t4. In that case, the self-reference
of consciousness may be achieved virtually at the same time point (just as two
people talking through Time Division Duplex in telecommunications don’t realize
that they are taking alternate turns). However, I argue that our consciousness
is unable to achieve it in an ideal sense, based on both scientific and
philosophical grounds. First, it contradicts Einstein. Second, our
consciousness should perish into nothing in order to achieve an ideal state of
self-referentiality. Infinitely high speed means no lapse in time. In other
words, there is no flow of time, which means that there is no consciousness. In
the critique of pure reason, Kant famously said that time exists because our
mind is constructed to view the universe in terms of it. That is, according to
Kant, time does not exist independently of our mind. Time exists because of our
consciousness, and vice versa.
- Insight from Cantor’s diagonal
argument
Think about Cantor’s diagonal
argument. The individual natural numbers correspond to all of the the
supposedly unique real numbers that there can be. However, Cantor’s diagonal
real number is always following in the table’s footsteps, as if the shadow was
always following a pedestrian in the sun. This diagonal real number does not
belong in the table. Whenever the table includes the real number in its list,
there will be yet another new real number that refuses to be included in the
table, thereby falsifying the one-to-one correspondence assumption between the
natural and real numbers.
Let us extend the above
analogical reasoning. The Cantor table cannot “know” that the infinite number
of real numbers that it matches with the corresponding natural numbers do not
represent the totality of the real numbers. The very moment that we include a
new real number in the table, it simultaneously creates a real number that is
not included in it. However, the simultaneously generated new real number
reflects information concerning every real number that there is in the table.
This is achieved by the diagonal calculation. More specifically, there is a
diagonal number that is based on every real number in the list, but the table
does not “know” that there is one. It assumes that it successfully matched
every real number with every natural number, but from an outsider’s view, that
is fallacious. One Korean proverb says: A good runner does not realize that
there is a good flyer above his head. Likewise, a person may believe that he
has free will, but it is possible that his actions/beliefs are deterministic
from an omniscient god’s viewpoint.
An alternative way of proof might
be to adopt the law of induction, but it would have to be said that by doing so
we accept the basis of the proof as an axiom that is independent, in our view,
of the deterministic system. (To be sure, we would still have to depend on
inductive reasoning even if it were possible to prove the determinacy of our
consciousness while we are in that particular “consciousness.”)
In conclusion, I believe that it
is provable that proof of determinism to an agent in a deterministic system
requires that there be a position that has provisional independence which
cannot be proved to have been predetermined to the agent.」
「Philosophy
purports to embrace and go beyond the totality of our knowledge but inevitably
fails because self-referential omniscience is never possible. That is, if
philosophy can correctly explain everything, it is no longer philosophy.
(i) In “My Sister and I,”
Nietzsche once said:
All my life has been a combat
between freedom and necessity, between my desire to be God and the necessity of
remaining a worm, although a worm with shining wings. My romanticism has been
my agony – which is the agony of my age, which seeks to transcend itself, and falls into the pit of doom and despair – the
dusty anguish of Obermann and Amiel buried alive in the skepticism of the
century.
(ii) Compare that with the
alternating truths of the following Cretan liar paradox:
“THIS SENTENCE IS FALSE.”
The above proposition begets:
“This sentence is false” is
false.
Again, “ ‘This sentence is false’
is false” is false.
Accordingly,
“This sentence is false” is false
is false is false is false is false is false is false is false is false is
false is false.. (ad infinitum)
Let us say, S= “This sentence is
false.”
Then, supposing S is true,
(1) S is false. (that is, S is
not true)
(2) “S is false” is false. (that
is, S is true)
(3) S is false is false is false.
(that is, S is not true)
… (ad inifinitum)
(iii) Lao Tzu, the creator of Tao
philosophy, said:
“To return is the movement of
Tao.”
Philosophers and natural
scientists alike strive to acquire knowledge of the transcendental realm/the
ultimate dimension of the universe but inevitably fail because of their
inherent human limitations.」
1. Godel and Self-reference
「Godel
states that the proposition “G=G is unprovable” is undecidable in formal
arithmetic. If we decide that it is false, i.e., there exists a proof string
from the axioms that leads to the proposition, the formal system is
inconsistent.
I admit that I do not understand
Godel’s proof at all. However, I believe that Wittgenstein had a good reason to
reject Godel’s theorem on his philosophical ground. The Godelian sentence is a
metamathematical proposition and not a mathematical proposition. I do not see
how a metamathematical paradox translates into an unsolvable proposition in the
formal system. Further, even in the realm of Godel’s metamathematical language,
it hardly seems that the Godelian sentence has any meaning. It is possible that
“G” on the left-hand side is different from that on the right hand side, i.e.,
G(1)=G(2)is unprovable. From my philosophical viewpoint, if we were to treat
G(1) and G(2) as the same, this would demolish the barrier between two heterogeneous
objects in the language of metamathematics. I do not deny the result of Godel’s
second incompleteness theorem, i.e., that the formal system cannot prove its
own consistency. To prove anything about its consistency issue, we would have
to get out of the formal system. However, I’m skeptical how his first
incompleteness theorem leads to the second one, because the first theorem is
based on the questionable paradoxical Godelian statement.
「In my
view, the implication of Godel’s incompleteness theorems is simple. It
is either that self-reference is impossible in mathematics; or that, if it were
possible, mathematics is doomed to nothing. Mathematics cannot
state anything about itself either by metamathematics or without it. We can
construct metamathematics as an attempt to make meaningful discoveries of
mathematics but are forced to conclude that it can’t tell us very much. In
other words, it is impossible to construct an omniscient view of mathematics
that tells us whether it is “complete and consistent,” “complete and
inconsistent,” “incomplete and consistent,” or “incomplete and inconsistent.”
*Furthermore, even if it’s
impossible to bypass the Godelian sentence, it should be noted that its
existence by itself does not guarantee that there are unsolvable problems of
mathematics. For example, Goldbach’s conjecture may have nothing to do with the
self-referential statement. In addition, even though the continuum hypothesis
was proved to be “undecidable,” this notion is different from “unsolvable.”
That it was proved to be undecidable means that the issue is solved.*
Adoption of the Godelian sentence
doesn’t tell us very much. Some may object that the formal system and its valid
metamathematical construction necessitate its existence. I understand that the
Godel numbering system creates a valid one-to-one correspondence relationship
between natural numbers and metamathematical/mathematical propositions.
However, if each individual proposition truly had a one and only distinct Godel
number, how did it come about that the Godel number of “G is unprovable” is the
same as that of “G is unprovable is unprovable”? Granting that this were
“arithmetically” true (because their Godel numbers are the same), how could we
expect to exclude the possibility that the Godel number of a proposition “A”
may be identical to the Godel number of a proposition “B,” which has a very
different semantic meaning from that of the proposition “A” but can be
“paraphrased” syntactically in order to have the same Godel number as that of “A”?
If their Godel numbers are the same, should we always treat both propositions
as those of a biconditional? If the Godel numbering system is sufficiently
strong, why hasn’t it been able to prevent the identity between “G is
unprovble” and “G is unprovable is unprovable”?
Aside from the above issue, let
us consider the following cases.
(1) “G is unprovable” is correct.
Some think that the above notion
causes us to accept the incompleteness of the formal system. The thing is, they
don’t realize that the formal system has become incomplete in regard to the
proposition.
(2) “G is unprovable” is false.
If this proposition is determined
to be false, the formal system is inconsistent. But we have to note its
inconsistency originates from the inconsistent statement itself.
(3) “G is unprovable” is
undecidable.
Because it is undecidable, it is
meaningless. The formal system can exist with or without it. Why don’t we
simply discard this useless notion?
If anything, Godel’s first
theorem proves that self-referential proposition is a meaningless notion in
mathematics.
2. Godel and Diagonal Argument
To my knowledge, the diagonal
argument proof of Godel’s incompleteness theorem rests on the idea that a n x n
(n to infinity, perhaps) table of the truth values of the provability of
one-free variable propositions - whose free variables are substituted wih the
Godel numbers of the propositions, e.g., p1(x)=p1(Godel number of p2), and so
on - fails to include a diagonal function, i.e., ~Provable*D(x). (D(x) may be
of such a form as p1(Godel number of p1).) I simply take this diagonal argument
to mean that no matter how many metamathematical one-free variable propositions
we prove, there will be a new metamathematical one-free variable proposition
that we have yet to include in the table and indicate its provability with
regard to the godel number of every other proposition. In that sense, an
analogy is established between Godel’s incompleteness theorem and the
impossibility of proving ultimate determinacy.
* These are simply my
philosophical reflections on Godel’s theorems, and I’ve only contemplated the
possibility of them being wrong in agreement with Wittgenstein’s view.」
- Hegelian perspective of
Wittgenstein’s “eye”
Let me digress to an interesting
viewpoint from Wittgenstein, who provided the following diagram:
<Excerpt from Tractatus
Logico Philosophicus>
What Wittgenstein is saying is
that the philosophical subject I contemplating the affairs of the universe
should be independent of the universe.
From a Hegelian perspective,
it can be said that the metaphysical “eye” in the above illustration alternates
between stepping in and stepping out of the universe; that only this perpetual
duality is what constitutes the interdependent relationship between the
metaphysical self and the universe as an object of our observation. Or it can
also be said that as soon as the metaphysical subject objectifies the universe
and declares a statement on the universe, the metaphysical subject is
fossilized and encapsulated by a bigger universe which is to be objectified yet
again by a somewhat different metaphysical subject at a subsequent time point.
A subject that ceases to be trapped in this Cretan liar paradox wouldn’t
probably be an intelligent being. In order to truly “understand” this Hegelian
line of reasoning, there should be a leap from this self-contradicting
description to the level of knowing similarly to the case where Wittgenstein
urged us to throw away the ladder after reading Tractatus Logico Philosophicus.
Because this leap’s existence cannot be formalized and begs the reader to get
to it on his own, I will say that this likely indicates “emergent” property of
our consciousness.
What separates us human beings
from artificial intelligence is that the latter does not seem to be trapped in
this world of self-referential paradox. Technically, everything that AI is
aware of can be expressed through codes; however, it cannot achieve a leap from
the known factual codes to the state of “knowing” the self-referential paradox.
AI does not ask whether the electrical states of the circuits being aware of
the determinacy of the universe were also determined. AI is simply as good as
dead in that it does not have the meta-consciousness of such a paradoxical
nature.
Say that we have an ideally
perfect web of pieces of information concerning the self-reflecting thought
processes of AI, which is technically in every way conscious like we are. Say
we enter in the AI machine the pieces of information that we know about AI.
What should happen is the same thing that would happen between God and
ourselves. We should not be able to prove to AI that we have deterministic
knowledge of its metaconsciousness, although its deterministic character is
provable to us. Otherwise, it would not a conscious being. In addition, even if
future genius scientists manage to create artificial intelligence that thinks
like us, they will only have discovered what electric configuration triggers
emergence of intelligence. Humans are forever barred from the knowledge of what
exactly enables emergence of intelligence. We cannot figure out precisely how
our consciousness works, because in order to do so we should see ourselves from
a higher realm that we cannot be in. It is my belief that our metaconsciousness
is enabled by our innate inability to get to this higher realm. From a Hegelian
perspective, I would say that the higher realm can be posited because of the
existence of our consciousness. 」
- Back to Cantor’s Diagonal
Argument
Let’s return to the Cantor
diagonal argument. There is no diagonal number unless the table first lists
real numbers in step with natural numbers. The real numbers in the table
necessitate existence of a diagonal number that cannot be included in the table
without breaking the one-to-one correspondence relation. A single particular
real number cannot be said to be a diagonal number when there are no underlying
real numbers that necessitate it. This case is akin to the case of a biconditional statement,
namely, p<=>q. We can substitute “p” with the case where
there are real numbers as elements of the Cantor table and “q” with the
existence of the diagonal number.
The Tao philosopher Lao
Tzu once said:
“tz’u liang chê, t’ung ch’u erh yi ming”
“Both emerge from the same source
and yet have different names.”
Likewise, the real number
elements in the table and the diagonal number come out of nothing at the same
time and yet belong in different dimensions. As such, the Kantian
“thing-in-itself” exists if and only if the perceiving mind exists, just as
there can be no consciousness unless there is unconsciousness in Freudian sense
and vice versa.」
「I said
above that AI is not meta-conscious yet. What about God, then? If God exists,
it is my bold assumption that He must also have meta-consciousness. If God
could prove to Himself that his meta-consciousness is either independent of or
subject to determinism, He wouldn’t be a sentient being. In that case, God
would simply be Mother Nature. Therefore, assuming that God is personal, He
would have absolute deterministic knowledge of the universe; however, he cannot
prove whether his meta-consciousness was also determined by a larger cosmos
that embraces both Him and our universe. The only sentient being that is
capable of deciding on this matter would be a being that examines the larger
cosmos; that is, there must be a meta-God. The point is: if even God observing
our universe is in the dark concerning the determinacy of His
meta-consciousness, why should we feel insecure about our own determinacy?
We can be pretty sure that God
doesn’t exist. If there is no god to tell us whether the universe is
deterministic or whether there is any objective purpose in life, wouldn’t we be
like our hypothetical God in that we may share with Him the property of
meta-consciousness that I discussed above? Our actions and beliefs might have
been predetermined from the onset (i.e., the Big Bang), but it doesn’t mean
that we are mindless automatons of no subjectivity or individuality. No divine
being can prove to us that our very decision to amor fati was
also predetermined, in the same manner that nobody can prove to us that we will
die because when we are dead, we are no longer here to witness our death
(please let me know who said this). If the world is truly deterministic, it is
reasonable to speculate that all our decisions/states of meta-consciousness
were determined – including the very way that this piece of writing is
structured – just as it is very certain that we will die although no one can
prove it to us unless by appeal to the law of induction. Nevertheless, the
practitioner of amor fati can be convinced of his uniqueness
in that not even God can trivialize his meta-consciousness from which he begins
to practice his love of fate. 」
- What Nietzsche Actually Said
Here are some of the quotes from
Nietzsche’s literary masterpiece, “Also Sprach Zarathustra.”
“Upwards: - in spite of the
spirit that drew it downwards, towards the abyss, the spirit of gravity, my
devil and archenemy.”
“And with tears in his eyes he
shall ask you for a dance and I myself will sing a song for his dance: a
dancing and mocking song on the spirit of gravity...”
Note the word “gravity.” The pull
of gravity is so powerful that any attempt to escape its influence is
essentially meaningless. You can only expect to hop several times off the
ground and the gravity will never set you free. Nevertheless, the
existentialist Nietzsche never stops dancing. He may be dragged down again and
again but continues to reaffirm his will to life through the constancy of his
fights. In this respect, this dancing described by Zarathustra is a tearful
moral victory. The fate is so much more powerful than you are, which is the
reason why any Schopenhauerian pessimists will stop resisting and sigh in
helplessness. However, for Nietzsche, it was precisely his finitude in front of
the fate that added greater aesthetic, poetic beauty to his bloody ongoing
fight against it. Nietzsche’s superman is a superman not because he can
exercise some supernatural talent or power to fend off the mighty fate. Rather,
it is the continuation of his fight that makes him a superman; he carries on
despite his awareness of his smallness.
Likewise, a practitioner of amor
fati may be a puppet whose movements are controlled by the determined laws of
the universe, but he remains a distinct existentialist of character in his
spirit.
*Disclaimer: Regarding my grounds
for the unprovability of determinism to a human agent of a deterministic
system, I will state that they are as fragile as the grounds for hardcore
determinism itself.
