Rethinking
Human and Machine Intelligence under Determinism
Abstract
This paper
proposes a metaphysical framework for distinguishing between human and machine
intelligence. It posits two identical deterministic worlds -- one comprising a
human agent and the other a machine agent. These agents exhibit different
information processing mechanisms despite their apparent sameness in a causal
sense. Providing a conceptual modeling of their difference, this paper resolves
what it calls “the vantage point problem” – namely, how to justify an
omniscient perspective through which a determinist asserts determinism from
within the supposedly deterministic universe.
Keywords: determinism; simulation; eternalism;
counterfactuals; pancomputationalism
Introduction
According to causal determinism, “every event is necessitated
by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature” (Hoefer,
2023, Section 0). Apparently, this is an innocuous, reasonable claim held by
contemporary thinkers well versed in scientific and philosophical literature. However,
when one asserts any form of determinism (e.g., scientific determinism) as well
as the causal one, what does it tell us about her as a being in the universe
where she makes the assertion?
When a determinist declares the determinacy of the
universe, she envisions every past/present/future event encapsulated in a static
realm. All of this appears “fossilized” from her lofty vantage point. However,
at that vantage point, her intellectual mind should progress dynamically to finally
render a judgment on the universe. Yet, by asserting determinism, she has
already placed herself -- the intellectual investigator of the universe -- in a
static realm. This gives rise to a
paradoxical situation where one occupies an allegedly legitimate viewpoint from
which to consider the universe as having been deprived of its dynamic nature by
using her “dynamic” intellect. To
reveal the subtle tension, let us formulate the case as follows.
Through an omniscient perspective, the determinist refers1
to:
The determinacy of all the events of the universe comprising
the very event of referring2 to the determinacy of all the events.
There are two issues:
(1) While the referring1 occurs dynamically,
the referring2 exists within a static realm. This shows a
discrepancy between the two. However, were they not meant to be the same thing?
(2) The mind associated with the referring1 targets
the mind associated with the referring2. However, it turns out that
they should be the same thing. In other words, although they were initially
thought to be different, it is seen in hindsight that the object (the mind
being targeted) has been the subject (the mind doing the targeting) all along
without our knowing it.
These issues ultimately lead to the problem of how a
finite being located within space and time could claim a God’s-eye viewpoint through
which to assert determinism. Let us call this a “vantage point (VP) problem.”
We can be tentatively certain that it applies to the determinist only. For
instance, the problem does not apply to the following case.
Through an omniscient perspective, a physicist refers3
to:
The omnipresent influence of gravity, which exerts its
sway even on the neuronal activities of the physicist’s brain required for
referring4 to the omnipresent influence of gravity as well as on all
the other events of the universe.
No indication can be found in the above statement
suggesting that the referring3 and referring4 exist simultaneously
in a static realm. Also, although gravity is one of the essential factors in
the event of making the assertion, her intellectual mind is not entirely
subjugated to gravity. Admittedly, her mind would not be able to exist without
her body, which is subject to gravity. Nevertheless, her investigating mind can
separate itself from the objects of the universe to which gravity applies. That
is, she can easily make the above assertion while existing within a
gravitational field. Therefore, no VP problem exists in this case.
Now, to address the problem, this paper will first
provide an instance of a metaphysical distinction between human and machine
intelligence. Specifically, it will discuss two different types of
deterministic worlds through a thought experiment. If readers patiently follow
this paper’s argument to the end, they will see how it establishes a plausible
model that allows a determinist to validly claim our universe as deterministic
while remaining a part of it.
1. Deterministic Knowledge
This paper will use the following key definitions:
(1) Deterministic
knowledge (D knowledge): A totality of facts associated with
all the past, present, and future events in a deterministic world.
(2) Deterministic
world: A world where events are deterministic. There is
metaphysical significance in considering a case of providing D knowledge to a
cognitive agent of this world.[1]
Definition (2) introduces a seemingly contradictory idea.
If D knowledge were provided to the agent, it suggests that she could gain
knowledge about her future. However, if she did attain such knowledge, the D
knowledge would no longer be valid because it fails to describe one particular
event: her attainment of the knowledge. To address this apparent contradiction,
this paper will examine reception of D knowledge in a metaphysical sense only.[2]
Now let us define two deterministic worlds.
(1) An original world like ours that comprises a human
agent.
(2) A simulated world that replicates every aspect of the
original world and comprises a machine agent emulating the human agent in a
causal manner.[3]
According to Schwartz (2012), determinism is the view
“that [possible] worlds cannot be the same up to a point and then diverge” (p.
216). However, in our thought experiment, it is possible that the deterministic worlds (1) and (2) are
computationally identical up to a particular point and then diverge when D
knowledge is provided to them. If one contends that the human mind cannot be
fully reduced to an algorithm, it becomes necessary to assume that such a
divergence is possible.
This paper will use concepts of
computationalism to describe information procesing. According
to Beraldo-de-Araújio, the essence of computation is “symbolic manipulation”
and concerns “mapping function between two sets of symbols” (Polak & Krzanowski,
2019, p. 6). The human agent’s symbolic manipulation, for instance, may take
place through neural activities in the brain. Meanwhile, the machine agent relies
on processing machine-readable symbols. By slightly changing Beraldo-de-Araújio’s
definitions, this paper defines computation as follows.
(a) A process is a function P: I → O such that its domain
I is a set whose elements are called input events
and its co-domain O is a set whose elements are called output events, while both I and O are subsets
of a physical world. For all x∈I, y = P(x) (y∈O) is a corresponding output
event.
(b) A computer is a function C: S → T from a set of input
symbols S to a set of output symbols T, such that C(x̅) is outputted
by computing x̅. (x̅ is a symbolic representation of x.) A process P: I → O is
computational if P is generated by a computer C.
In the simulated world, we suppose that the
mind is a “classical von Neumann computer” and that “its representation-bearers
[are] data structures” (Frankish
& Ramsey, 2012, pp. 31-32).[4]
This world is intentionally designed to avoid being based on a “connectionist”
model.[5]
Specifically, it may not be feasible for the connectionist model to accurately
emulate the human agent due to its highly stochastic nature.[6]
Such a feature might hinder accurate realization of a scripted scenario. Although
the classical model may be much less sophisticated, it can at least robustly
emulate human behaviors in hindsight if all the relevant information is available.
1.1 Type 1
If the D knowledge specific to the simulated world is
provided to its agent, the agent would process reception of the D knowledge simply
as one of the existing potential input events. This world is governed by a predefined type of D knowledge (i.e.,
Type 1) that dictates how things
should occur.
See the following mappings.
I = {x1, x2, …, xn}
O = {y1, y2, …, yn}
Since this world is deterministic, only one of the input
events from x1 to xn is bound to occur. Nevertheless, in
order to enhance the “realness” of the simulated world, the above sets have
been configured to include a reasonably finite number of input-output pairs
other than the actual pair. These are included as conditional cases in Type-1 D
knowledge. Now suppose that reception of D knowledge occurs immediately before
a particular event in the input event set does. Then:
xD = xk (xD is reduced
to xk.) 1 ≤ k ≤ n
xD = Reception of D knowledge
yD = yk
yD = Response to reception of D knowledge
To illustrate the triviality of the simulated world, let
us consider a hypothetical scenario involving a clinical psychologist named “Millicent”
(or simply “Millie”). She loves coffee but often hesitates whether to drink it.
One morning, she decides to have a coffee anyway while watching a seminar video
through a tablet device. The following event
mappings are established for her in atomic-sentential form:
x1 = The seminar tires me.
x2 = The coffee does not convince me of
insomnia.
x3 = The coffee convinces me of insomnia.
y1 = I stop watching.
y2 = I keep drinking.
y3 = I stop drinking.
Recall that only one particular such as x1 has
been configured to actually occur. However, assume that specific descriptions
in the D knowledge could be provided to her immediately before x1 happens.
Suppose that her tablet displays not only the above mappings but also a short
history of her activities in the morning and the events to unfold throughout
the day. How would she respond?
From a humanistic perspective, there must be a distinct
mental representation corresponding to the event of “I see the descriptions.”
However, Millie’s processing mechanism would only be able to interpret the
sight of the display as one of x̅1 to x̅3. Recall that
Millie’s mind follows the classical computer model whose representation-bearers
are data structures. Since she is only a machine agent, a bit structure
corresponding to her symbolic representation of the event would most probably
be translated to a particular bit structure corresponding to one of x̅1 to
x̅3. Suppose that it is interpreted as x̅3. Then, her
processing mechanism would output y̅3, which should be accompanied
by y3. In other words, she would probably stop drinking her coffee
in response to receiving the D knowledge. This result is not surprising (i.e.,
is trivial) because only the predefined sets of inputs/outputs were configured
for the simulated world.
1.2 Type 2
If the D knowledge specific to the original world were
provided to its agent, the agent would process reception of the D knowledge as
a unique input event. But what is the basis for this characterization of the
world?
Recall from the paper’s first footnote that contemporary
metaphysicians (e.g., Vihvelin (2023)) accept a metaphysical possibility of
time travel to the past. Time travel would not simply suggest displacement of
one’s body. It would also mean that the time traveler could bring some of the
accumulated knowledge about the world to the past. In this case, it would be
hard to imagine that an agent in the past would show only a robot-like reaction
to the knowledge of her future. Similarly, if the original world’s agent
received D knowledge, it is reasonable to expect that she would provide a
non-trivial response to it.
Then
how would the D knowledge of the original world differ from that of its
simulated counterpart? To begin with, let us first assume an as-of-yet-unnamed type
of determinism where events follow causality but causality, in principle, may not necessarily definitively
determine their characteristics with
respect to the perspective of the agent within the world.[7]
Although this “unnamed” determinism may seem odd, eternalism can provide a
deterministic picture of the events under such a causal system. What is
eternalism, then? According to Thyssen (2020), it is a view that “all events in
the history of the Universe are equally
real -- regardless of whether we judge them past, present, or future” (p.
6). Further, in the eternalist model, “[w]hether past, present or future, all events ‘lie frozen’ in the
four-dimensional block, much like the scenes from a movie are fixed on the film
roll.”
Accordingly, adopting eternalism, we can conceive of a D
knowledge (i.e., Type 2) that only reflects
every physical event across time without including counterfactual cases. If one were to see the events of
the world like fixed scenes on a film roll across time, she might be able to
extrapolate to a certain extent counterfactual cases associated with those
events. However, the scenes themselves do not include such information.
Meanwhile, we see that metaphysical emergence of a new output in response to D knowledge reception is necessary,
since the agent’s processing mechanism follows causality. However, the content of the new output may be deterministic or non-deterministic.
How so? Although the eternalist model can provide a deterministic view of this world, it cannot do the same of the
metaphysical realm beyond. Therefore,
whether the output’s content would be deterministic/non-deterministic only
remains a question.
1.3 Type 3
Now let us embrace causal determinism to the fullest --
beyond this world to the metaphysical realm. Then, we can entertain the idea that
its agent’s decision-making processes are strictly deterministic in a
metaphysical as well as physical sense. Unlike in subsection 1.2, the agent could
now produce a new output, whose content is deterministic, in response to receiving
D knowledge of Type 2. This hypothetical situation would generate a derivative
version of D knowledge (namely, D’). Then, the agent should produce another
output in response to receiving D’, thereby generating another derivative
version of D knowledge (namely, D’’). To aid in understanding this somewhat
complex scenario, let us go back to the Millie story. With regard to the Millie
of the original world, D’ knowledge might state as follows:
“Millie responds to D knowledge. She speaks, “Am I living
in a Matrix?”
D’’ knowledge might state:
“Millie responds to D’ knowledge. She speaks, ‘I might
need to take some medication to calm my caffeine-induced paranoia. Or maybe
this world that I’m living in was monstrously rigged, and I must somehow
survive by figuring out how I first reacted to… I don’t know, but it seems like
this situation that I’m in happened already once before, and I must figure out
whatever this evil gadget had said in the first place. Let me think… Whatever
action I take right now, was that also predetermined?’”
See the following mappings:[8]
I = {x1, x2, …, xn, (xn+1),
(xn+2), … }
O = {y1, y2, …, yn, (yn+1),
(yn+2), …}
xD = xn+1 yD = yn+1
xD’ = xn+2 yD’
= yn+2
… …
The above mappings may develop indefinitely.[9]
All these potentially infinite counterfactual cases are included in Type 3.[10]
Further, we can say that this type of knowledge is generated by an inherent configuration of the world.[11]
For instance, Tegmark (2008) argues that “our universe
could be simulated by quite a short
computer program” (p. 18) (emphasis added). Based on the idea that “our
universe is mathematics” (p. 1), he
maintains that its realization only requires storage of “all the 4-dimensional
data” (p. 18). Specifically, the 4-dimensional data include all the “[encoded]
properties of the mathematical structure that is our universe” (p.18). If his
argument is true, we would not need D knowledge (consisting of linguistic
descriptions) to simulate a universe. Rather, D knowledge would be a byproduct
of the mathematical structure.
2. The Vantage Point Problem
This section explores how the VP problem can be addressed
through the use of D knowledge. Let us first look into two cases where this problem
has not been appropriately addressed.
(1) Tegmark[12]
(2008) asserts that “[t]here exists an external physical reality completely
independent of us humans” and that “[o]ur external physical reality is a
mathematical structure (p. 1). However, despite presenting convincing
arguments, he still fails to address the VP problem. In footnote 3 on p. 5, he
notices the problem of how a mathematician should derive, through (i) a
mathematical structure alone, (ii) an empirical domain and (iii) “a set of
correspondence rules which link parts of the mathematical structure with parts
of the empirical domain.” He hints at a possibility of achieving this by
introducing a “car” analogy. Specifically, “given an abstract but complete
description of a car (essentially the locations of its atoms),” “someone” that
wants “practical use of this car” might “be able to figure out how the car
works and write her own manual” by “carefully examining the original
description.” Put simply:
“Someone” → Mathematician
Car → Universe
Description of the car → Mathematical structure of the
universe
Practical use of the car → Empirical domain of the universe
Knowledge of how the car works → Correspondence rules linking the
mathematical structure with the empirical domain
While the mathematician is a part of the universe, that “someone”
is not a part of the car. Therefore, the car analogy fails. The analogy would have
been more accurate if the “someone” had a complete description of both herself and the car.[13]
Tegmark’s case is one instance illustrating a common mistake made by scientists
as well as philosophers – namely, the confusion that arises from the VP
problem.
(2) Dennett (2003) notes that "confusion [over
determinism] arises when one tries to maintain two perspectives on the universe
at once" (p. 93). One perspective is the "God's eye"
perspective, and the other is the "engaged perspective of an agent within
the universe." His description of the former perspective coincides with
the Parmenidean view of the universe. He adds that “[f]rom the timeless
God's-eye perspective nothing ever changes," as "the whole history of
the universe is laid out 'at once.'" Dennett appears to give equal weights
to both perspectives but cautions against assuming them at the same time. He does
not provide a philosophical scheme where both perspectives can coexist. Specifically,
he does not reveal how it is possible for the agent within the universe to
assert determinism from a provisional God’s-eye perspective.
The above two cases illustrate the ongoing struggle of
scientists and philosophers to reconcile the discrepancy between a human agent asserting
determinism and the universe where the agent belongs. It is believed that this paper
has resolved this issue to a certain extent. Unlike machines, human
intelligence is capable of emergently processing -- to use a bit of an oxymoron
-- even “otherworldly but comprehensible” knowledge (i.e., D knowledge).[14]
By definition, D knowledge is an entirety of verbal descriptions encompassing
the whole universe. This knowledge is inherently inaccessible; therefore, it
can be considered to exist in an “otherworldly” realm. Nevertheless, it is
deemed “comprehensible” from the human agent’s perspective, as evidenced by its
capacity to provide a non-trivial response to it. This suggests that the human agent
could potentially view the universe from a vantage point situated in a realm
beyond the universe despite actually being a part of it. However, for machine
intelligence, D knowledge is neither “otherworldly” nor “comprehensible.” In fact,
there is no type of information at all that can be genuinely comprehended by
machines. This is illustrated through the triviality of a response it might
generate with regard to D knowledge in subsection 2.1.
Further, the same level of triviality could be said to be
exhibited by a hypothetical agent whose declaration of determinism should be
assumed to be qualitatively inseparable, in a pancomputational[15]
sense, from all the other events of the world. Specifically, in a world without
any distinction between the two (i.e., espousal of determinism and the other
physical phenomena), the agent (possibly a machine one) would have no
motivation in the first place to assume a higher “vantage point” from which to
view the world. Roughly speaking, in such a world, no scholarly debate on
determinism would have any meaning. If our universe is to be depicted
differently from that world, a determinist’s declaration of determinism should
by necessity stand out by acquiring a particular metaphysical meaning amidst all
the events of the universe. This is achieved by granting a privileged status to
the determinist regardless of the truthfulness of her argument. She can be
granted such a status because of her inherent capacity to comprehend D
knowledge.
Finally, note that this peculiar dynamic between the
determinist’s philosophical mind and the universe can be best described through
a dialectic circle in Maybee (2020, Section 1). Before the determinist decides
on the determinacy of the events of the universe, these events must first be
placed within her scope of thoughts. In other words, they should become the
objects of her speculative investigation. Then, as she declares determinism,
she realizes that the entire process (from her investigation up to the
declaration) is also part of the deterministic scenario. Subsequently, she concludes
from a transient God’s-eye perspective that every time she declares determinism,
this would have also been predetermined.
The above process continues,[16]
thereby generating the dialectic circle. It expands as the determinist’s mind
and the objects/events of the universe continue to encircle each other in an
alternating manner. This type of circle provides a more nuanced illustration
than the image of “eye” of the “metaphysical subject” encapsulated within “the
field of sight” in Wittgenstein (1922, p. 75), as well as a different image
that one may newly draw by placing the eye outside the field of sight.
Conclusion
Deterministic knowledge:
l
Type 1
n
Dictates the world.
n
Includes finite conditional cases.
l
Type 2
n
Reflects the world.
n
Includes no counterfactual cases.
l
Type 3
n
Is generated by the world.
n
Includes infinite counterfactual cases.
Based on the above scheme, this paper has sought to
distinguish human from machine intelligence by allowing for determinism. Additionally,
it addressed how to justify the
God’s-eye perspective required for a determinist to assert determinism despite
being placed within the universe.
However,
this paper may face several challenges from readers. First, one might point out
that the paper relies only on metaphysical speculation and lacks empirical
support. However, many philosophical ideas are inherently speculative, aiming
to look beyond the realm of empirical science. Despite their purely speculative
nature, they can meaningfully influence the empirical world. For instance, this
paper’s framework can be taken as a normative model for human vs. machine
intelligence. Under this model, we can consider measuring a level of
enhancement in a connectionist-based AI by studying its response to a history
of its replica provided as a certain kind of “D knowledge.”
Second, one
might argue that the VP problem is not really a problem. She may have no
difficulty accepting the idea that a determinist can describe the universe from
a viewpoint situated within the universe. She can conveniently appeal to the
causality principle to support determinism. However, causality itself does not
tell us very much about her status as an intellectual being. If she conflates
herself with mindless machines in accordance with pancomputationalism, her
concern for the truth of determinism becomes insignificant. Philosophical
truths are dead issues to mechanical beings. What this paper has done is
illustrate a subtle difference between human and machine intelligence by
assuming that both adhere to causality.
Third, one could
assert that this paper’s main idea totally collapses if determinism is wrong. Indeed,
if the universe is indeterministic, the VP problem is no longer a problem. It
naturally vanishes since indeterminism would suggest that the philosophical
investigator of the universe is in the process of discovering how the universe
is unfolding. But would the distinction between human and machine intelligence
still hold? One way of postulating their difference could be to argue as
follows in a counterfactual manner. If a human agent in the past received our knowledge
of her history (which would be regarded as a form of future knowledge for her),
she would generate a non-trivial response to it. However, a machine agent would
not be able to.
Fourth, one
could suggest that this paper seems to beg the question by assuming from the
beginning that humans and machines are already different. Despite this being a
limitation, the author believes that it provided one original instance of a
logical possibility where machines fall short of human intelligence.
Finally, note
that the paper’s argument began by embracing eternalism and causal determinism
whose acceptance by an agent within the universe was challenged in the paper’s
introduction. That is, this paper did not directly confront the two issues (the
static vs. dynamic paradox; and the subject/object equivalency). The author
believes that they can be resolved head-on through Hegelian philosophy. This
problem remains for further study.
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Verso.
[1]
Vihvelin (2023) proposes “[leaving] open the metaphysical possibility of time
travel to the past” (Abstract). This concept is philosophically worth
considering, even though it is unlikely to materialize in reality. Note that
her proposal implicitly involves the idea of providing D knowledge to an agent
in the past.
[2]
We assume that the cognitive agent receives only a “small breadth” of D
knowledge that is associated with the agent. The entirety of D knowledge would
be too immense to be processed by any agent.
[3]
Müller (2014) indicates that two different
physical processes P1 and P2 can perform the same
computation C (p. 9). Similarly, the original and simulated worlds are
computationally the same but ultimately different.
[4]
A representation-bearer is a
means through which an object being represented is thought/perceived by an
agent. See Frankish & Ramsey (2012, p. 9).
[5]
Connectionism suggests that “individual neurons do not transmit large amounts
of symbolic information” and that “they compute by being appropriately
connected to large numbers of similar units” (Feldman & Ballard, 1982, p.
208).
[6]
Testing whether a connectionist-based AI could think like humans may require a
different approach like Schneider’s (2019) ACT test (p. 54). Or we can imagine
testing the AI by feeding it with a history of its replica as a certain kind of
“D knowledge.”
[7] Regarding a universal
proposition that “[a]lways, given an A, a B follows,” Steward (2022) cites
Anscombe, who suggests that our inability to “describe the absence of circumstances
in which an A would not cause a B” challenges identification of causation with
necessitation (p. 9). In other words, it is possible that “A” causes “B” but it
is not necessary for “B” to follow. Nevertheless, this possibility does not
justify the “conclusion that determinism is certainly false” (p. 12).
[8] (xn+1),
(xn+2), (yn+1), and (yn+2) are enclosed in
their parentheses to highlight that they are unique counterfactual cases
associated with D knowledge.
[9] Similarly, Sterelny (1990) notes that the “ability to
think about the world as it is and as it might be, to think indefinitely many
and indefinitely complex thoughts” may be a “necessary condition on having
intentional states” (p. 29).
[10]
When considering the infinite counterfactual cases, we
see that no predefined type of D knowledge (i.e., Type 1) can simulate a world
genuinely resembling the original world.
[11]
This configuration may be beyond our reach as demonstrated through the Kantian
antinomies (Kant, 1998, pp. 470-495).
[12]
Tegmark is a determinist. He supports Einstein’s dictum that “God does not play
dice” (p. 10).
[13]
Even if she had all the information regarding her mind/body as well as the car
from a materialistic viewpoint, she might still fail to explain how her bodily
composition gives rise to consciousness. Even a complete mathematical
formulation of the neural correlates of consciousness may not fully elucidate
its nature. Such an “epistemological limitation” may be a necessary condition
for consciousness, as “the transcendental standpoint is in a sense irreducible,
for one cannot look ‘objectively’ at oneself” (Žižek, 2012, p. 239).
[14] Simply speaking, we
could show a non-trivial response to the knowledge of our future were we to
receive it.
[15]
According to pancomputationalism, “everything is a computing system” and “minds
are computing systems too” (Piccinini, 2007, p. 95).
[16]
This type of infinite progression is believed to be a central feature of
philosophy, as seen in Kripke’s “Kripkenstein,” Derrida’s “différance,” the
Liar Paradox, and Lao Tzu’s Taoism.
