Rethinking
Human and Machine Intelligence under Determinism
(PREPRINT)
JAE JEONG
LEE
College of
English, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 107 Imun-ro, Dongdaemun-gu,
Seoul
Abstract
This paper proposes a metaphysical framework for
distinguishing between human and machine intelligence. It posits two identical
deterministic worlds -- one comprising a human agent and the other a machine
agent. These agents exhibit different information processing mechanisms despite
their apparent sameness in a causal sense. Providing a conceptual modeling of
their difference, this paper resolves what it calls “the vantage point problem”
– namely, how to justify an omniscient perspective through which a determinist
asserts determinism from within the supposedly deterministic universe.
Keywords: determinism; simulation; eternalism;
counterfactuals; pancomputationalism
Introducción
According
to causal determinism, “every event is necessitated by antecedent events and
conditions together with the laws of nature” (Hoefer, 2023, Section 0).
Apparently, this is an innocuous, reasonable claim held by contemporary
thinkers well versed in scientific and philosophical literature. However, what
does determinism suggest about the determinist as a being?
Determinism
involves envisioning every past/present/future event encapsulated in a static
realm. All of this appears frozen/stagnant from a God’s-eye viewpoint. However,
from this standpoint, her intellectual mind should progress dynamically to
render a judgment on the universe. Yet, by asserting determinism, she places
herself within the static realm. Let us pursue this more closely through the
following formulation.
The
determinist refers1 to:
The
determinacy of all the events in the universe, including the act of referring2
to the determinacy of all the events.
While referring1 occurs dynamically, referring2
exists within a static realm. Therefore, there is a discrepancy. But this
is not the sole issue. In this scenario, the determinist’s mind (“M1”)
engaged in referring1 targets the mind (“M2”) engaged in
referring2. However, M1 and M2 are presumed to
be the same entity. Then, M2 should also target M1,
creating an infinite loop where they continue to target each other. It is hard
to imagine that this would be her state of mind. Meanwhile, we can imagine that
she might belatedly realize that her assertion of determinism was also a
predetermined event. However, because this realization occurs temporally after
the assertion, the state of mind (akin to M1) during the realization
cannot be identical to the state of mind (akin to M2) during the
assertion. For them to be identical, there would have to be no time lapse
between them, which is absurd.
The
dilemma would not arise if we assumed that she was examining the universe as an
outside observer. However, this is not possible because she is a finite being
located within space and time. This leads
us to the “the vantage point (VP) problem” – namely, how to justify an
omniscient perspective through which she asserts determinism from within the
supposedly deterministic universe.
We
can be tentatively certain that it applies to the determinist only. For
instance, the problem does not apply to the following case.
A
physicist refers3 to:
The
influence of gravity, which exerts its sway even on the neuronal activities of
her brain required for referring4 to the influence of gravity as
well as on all the other objects in the universe.
There
is no indication suggesting that referring3 and referring4
exist in a static realm. Additionally, although gravity is one of the essential
factors in the act of making the assertion, her mind is not entirely subjugated
to gravity. Admittedly, her mind would not be able to exist without her body,
which is subject to gravity. Nevertheless, the mind can separate itself from
the objects in the universe to which gravity applies. Thus, she can easily
engage in referring3 while existing within a gravitational field.
Therefore, no VP problem exists in this case.
Now,
to address the VP problem, this paper will provide a metaphysical speculation
for distinguishing between human and machine intelligence. Specifically, it
will discuss two different types of deterministic worlds through a thought
experiment. Then, it will provide a plausible model that allows a determinist
to validly claim the universe as deterministic while remaining a part of it.
1.
Deterministic
Knowledge
This paper will use the following key definitions:
(1) Deterministic
knowledge (D knowledge): A totality of facts associated with
all the past, present, and future events in a deterministic world.
(2) Deterministic
world: A world where events are deterministic. There is
metaphysical significance in considering a case of providing D knowledge to a
cognitive agent of this world.[1]
Definition (2) introduces a seemingly contradictory idea.
If D knowledge were provided to the agent, it suggests that she could gain
knowledge about her future. However, if she did attain such knowledge, the D
knowledge would no longer be valid. Why? Because it
fails to describe one particular event: her attainment of the knowledge. To
address this apparent contradiction, this paper will examine reception of D
knowledge in a metaphysical sense
only.[2]
Now let us define two deterministic worlds.
(1) An original world like ours that comprises a human
agent.
(2) A simulated world that replicates every aspect of the
original world and comprises a machine agent emulating the human agent in a
causal manner.[3]
According to Schwartz (2012), determinism is the view
“that [possible] worlds cannot be the same up to a point and then diverge” (p.
216). However, in our thought experiment, it is possible that the deterministic worlds (1) and (2) are
computationally identical up to a particular point and then diverge when D
knowledge is provided to them. If one contends that the human mind cannot be
fully reduced to an algorithm, it becomes necessary to assume that such a
divergence is possible.
This paper will use concepts of
computationalism to describe information processing. According
to Beraldo-de-Araújio, the essence of computation is “symbolic manipulation”
and concerns “mapping function between two sets of symbols” (Polak &
Krzanowski, 2019, p. 6). The human agent’s symbolic manipulation, for instance,
may take place through neural activities in the brain. Meanwhile, the machine
agent relies on processing machine-readable symbols. By slightly changing
Beraldo-de-Araújio’s definitions, this paper defines computation as follows.
(a) A process is a function P: I → O such that its domain
I is a set whose elements are called input events
and its co-domain O is a set whose elements are called output events, while both I and O are subsets
of a physical world. For all x∈I,
y = P(x) (y∈O) is a corresponding output
event.
(b) A computer is a function C: S → T from a set of input
symbols S to a set of output symbols T, such that C(x̅) is outputted
by computing x̅. (x̅ is a symbolic representation of x.) A process P: I → O is
computational if P is generated by a computer C.
In the simulated world, we suppose that the
mind is a “classical von Neumann computer” and that “its representation-bearers
[are] data structures”
(Frankish & Ramsey, 2012,
pp. 31-32).[4]
This world is intentionally designed to avoid being based on a “connectionist”
model.[5]
Specifically, it may not be feasible for the connectionist model to accurately
emulate the human agent due to its highly stochastic nature.[6]
Such a feature might hinder accurate realization of a scripted scenario.
Although the classical model may be much less sophisticated, it can at least
robustly emulate human behaviors in hindsight if all the relevant information
is available.
1.1.
Type
1
If the D knowledge specific to the simulated world is provided
to its agent, the agent would process reception of the D knowledge simply as
one of the existing potential input events. This world is governed by a predefined type of D knowledge (i.e.,
Type 1) that dictates how things
should occur.
See the following mappings.
I = {x1, x2, …, xn}
O = {y1, y2, …, yn}
Since this world is deterministic, only one of the input
events from x1 to xn is bound to occur. Nevertheless, in
order to enhance the “realness” of the simulated world, the above sets have
been configured to include a reasonably finite number of input-output pairs
other than the actual pair. These are included as conditional cases in Type-1 D
knowledge. Now suppose that reception of D knowledge occurs immediately before
a particular event in the input event set does. Then:
xD = xk (xD is reduced
to xk.) 1 ≤ k ≤ n
xD = Reception of D knowledge
yD = yk
yD = Response to reception of D knowledge
To illustrate the triviality of the simulated world, let
us consider a hypothetical scenario involving a clinical psychologist named
“Millicent” (or simply “Millie”). She loves coffee but often hesitates whether
to drink it. One morning, she decides to have a coffee anyway while watching a
seminar video on a tablet device. The following event mappings are established for her
in atomic-sentential form:
x1 = The seminar tires me.
x2 = The coffee does not convince me of
insomnia.
x3 = The coffee convinces me of insomnia.
y1 = I stop watching.
y2 = I keep drinking.
y3 = I stop drinking.
Recall that only one particular such as x1 has
been configured to actually occur. However, assume that specific descriptions
in the D knowledge could be provided to her immediately before x1
happens. Suppose that her tablet displays not only the above mappings but also
a short history of her activities in the morning and the events to unfold
throughout the day. How would she respond?
From a human agent’s
perspective, there must be a distinct mental representation corresponding to
the event of “I see the descriptions.” However, Millie’s processing mechanism
would only be able to interpret the sight of the display as one of x̅1 to
x̅3. Recall that Millie’s mind follows the classical computer model
whose representation-bearers are data structures. Since she is only a machine
agent, a bit structure corresponding to her symbolic representation of the
event would most probably be translated to a particular bit structure corresponding
to one of x̅1 to x̅3. Suppose that it is interpreted as
x̅3. Then, her processing mechanism would output y̅3,
which should be accompanied by y3. In other words, she would
probably stop drinking her coffee upon
receiving the D knowledge. This result is not surprising because only the
predefined sets of inputs/outputs were configured for the simulated world.
1.2.
Type
2
If the D knowledge specific to the original world were
provided to its agent, the agent would process reception of the D knowledge as
a unique input event. But what justifies this characterization of the world?
Recall from the paper’s first footnote that contemporary
metaphysicians (e.g., Vihvelin (2023)) accept a metaphysical possibility of
time travel to the past. Time travel would not simply suggest displacement of
one’s body. It would also mean that the time traveler could bring some of the
accumulated knowledge about the world to the past. In this case, it would be
hard to imagine that an agent in the past would show only a robot-like reaction
to the knowledge of her future. Similarly, if the original world’s agent
received D knowledge, it is reasonable to expect that she would provide a
non-trivial response to it.
Then how would the D knowledge of the original world
differ from that of its simulated counterpart? To begin with, let us first
assume an as-of-yet-unnamed type of determinism.
Under this determinism, causality may not necessarily definitively determine the events with respect to
the agent’s perspective.[7]
Although this “unnamed” determinism may seem odd, eternalism can provide a
deterministic picture of the events. What is eternalism, then? According to
Thyssen (2020), it is a view that “all events in the history of the Universe
are equally real -- regardless of
whether we judge them past, present, or future” (p. 6). Further, “[w]hether past, present or future,
all events ‘lie frozen’ in the four-dimensional block, much like the scenes
from a movie are fixed on the film roll.”
Accordingly, adopting eternalism, we can conceive of a D
knowledge (i.e., Type 2) that only reflects
every physical event across time without including counterfactual cases. If one were to see the events of
the world like fixed scenes on a film roll across time, she might be able to
extrapolate, to a certain extent, counterfactual cases associated
with those events. However, the scenes themselves do not include such
information.
Meanwhile, we see that metaphysical emergence of a new output upon receiving D
knowledge is necessary, since the agent’s processing mechanism follows
causality. However, the content of the new output may be
deterministic or non-deterministic. How so? Although the eternalist model can
provide a deterministic view of this
world, it cannot do the same of the metaphysical
realm beyond. Therefore, whether the output’s content is
deterministic/non-deterministic only remains a question.
1.3.
Type
3
Now let us embrace causal determinism to the fullest --
beyond this world to the metaphysical realm. Then, we can entertain the idea
that its agent’s decision-making processes are strictly deterministic in a
metaphysical as well as physical sense. In
contrast to subsection 1.2, the agent should
generate a new output with deterministic content if she were to
receive D knowledge of Type 2. Moreover,
this situation should generate
a new version of D knowledge (namely,
D’) that describes her reception of existing D
knowledge. Then, the agent should produce another new output with regard to D’. This should generate another new
version of D knowledge (namely, D’’). To facilitate
comprehension of this somewhat complex scenario, let us go back to the Millie
story. With regard to the Millie of the original world, D’ knowledge might
state as follows:
“Millie responds to D knowledge. She says, “Am I living in a Matrix?”
D’’ knowledge might state:
“Millie responds to D’ knowledge. She says, ‘I might need to take some medication to calm my
caffeine-induced paranoia. Or maybe this world that I’m living in was monstrously
rigged, and I must somehow survive by figuring out how I first reacted to… I
don’t know, but it seems like this situation that I’m in happened already once
before, and I must figure out whatever this evil gadget had said in the first
place. Let me think… Whatever action I take right now, was that also
predetermined?’”
See the following mappings:[8]
I = {x1, x2, …, xn, (xn+1),
(xn+2), … }
O = {y1, y2, …, yn, (yn+1),
(yn+2), …}
xD = xn+1 yD = yn+1
xD’ = xn+2 yD’
= yn+2
… …
The above mappings may develop indefinitely.[9]
All these potentially infinite counterfactual cases are included in Type 3.[10]
Further, we can say that this type of knowledge is generated by an inherent configuration of the world.[11]
For instance, Tegmark (2008) argues that “our universe
could be simulated by quite a short
computer program” (p. 18) (emphasis added). Based on the idea that “our
universe is mathematics” (p. 1), he
maintains that its realization only requires storage of “all the 4-dimensional
data” (p. 18). Specifically, the 4-dimensional data include all the “[encoded]
properties of the mathematical structure that is our universe” (p.18). If his
argument is true, we would not need D knowledge (consisting of linguistic
descriptions) to simulate a universe. Rather, D knowledge would be a byproduct
of the mathematical structure.
2.
The
Vantage Point Problem
This section explores how the VP problem can be addressed
through the use of D knowledge. Let us first look into two cases where this
problem has not been appropriately addressed.
(1) Tegmark[12]
(2008) asserts that “[t]here exists an external physical reality completely
independent of us humans” and that “[o]ur external physical reality is a
mathematical structure (p. 1). However, despite presenting convincing
arguments, he still fails to address the VP problem. In footnote 3 on p. 5, he
notices the problem of how a mathematician should derive, through (i) a
mathematical structure alone, (ii) an empirical domain and (iii) “a set of
correspondence rules which link parts of the mathematical structure with parts
of the empirical domain.” He hints at a possibility of achieving this by
introducing a “car” analogy. Specifically, “given an abstract but complete
description of a car (essentially the locations of its atoms),” “someone” that
wants “practical use of this car” might “be able to figure out how the car
works and write her own manual” by “carefully examining the original
description.” Put simply:
“Someone” → Mathematician
Car → Universe
Description of the car → Mathematical structure of the
universe
Practical use of the car → Empirical domain of the
universe
Knowledge of how the car works → Correspondence rules
linking the mathematical structure with the empirical domain
While the mathematician is a part of the universe, that
“someone” is not a part of the car. Therefore, the car analogy fails. The
analogy would have been more accurate if the “someone” had a complete
description of both herself and the
car.[13]
Tegmark’s case is one instance illustrating a common mistake made by scientists
as well as philosophers – namely, the confusion that arises from the VP
problem.
(2) Dennett (2003) notes that "confusion [over
determinism] arises when one tries to maintain two perspectives on the universe
at once" (p. 93). One perspective is the "God's eye"
perspective, and the other is the "engaged perspective of an agent within
the universe." His description of the former perspective coincides with
the Parmenidean view of the universe. He adds that “[f]rom the timeless
God's-eye perspective nothing ever changes," as "the whole history of
the universe is laid out 'at once.'" Dennett appears to give equal weight
to both perspectives but cautions against assuming them at the same time. He
does not provide a philosophical scheme where both perspectives can coexist.
Specifically, he does not reveal how it is possible for the agent within the
universe to assert determinism from a provisional God’s-eye perspective.
The above two cases illustrate the ongoing struggle of
scientists and philosophers to reconcile the discrepancy between a human agent
asserting determinism and the universe. It is believed that this paper has
resolved this issue to a certain extent. Unlike machines, humans are capable of emergently processing even “otherworldly but
comprehensible” knowledge (i.e., D knowledge).[14]
Since D
knowledge is an entirety of verbal descriptions encompassing the universe, it is inherently inaccessible. Therefore, it can be considered to exist in an “otherworldly”
realm. Nevertheless, it is deemed “comprehensible” from a human agent’s perspective. This is evidenced
by its capacity to provide a non-trivial response to it. This suggests that the
human agent could potentially view the universe from a vantage point situated
in a realm beyond the universe. However, for machine intelligence, D knowledge
is neither “otherworldly” nor “comprehensible.” In fact, there is no type of
information at all that can be genuinely comprehended by machines. This is
illustrated through the triviality of a response it might generate with regard
to D knowledge in subsection 2.1.
Further, the same level of triviality could be said to be
exhibited by a hypothetical agent whose declaration of determinism should be assumed
to be qualitatively inseparable, in a pancomputational[15]
sense, from all the other events of the world. Specifically, in a world without
any distinction between the two (i.e., espousal of determinism and the other
physical phenomena), the agent (possibly a machine one) would have no
motivation to assume a higher “vantage point.”
Roughly speaking, in such a world, no scholarly debate on determinism would
have any meaning. If our universe is to be depicted differently from that
world, a determinist’s declaration of determinism should by necessity stand out
by acquiring metaphysical significance. This is
achieved by granting a privileged status to the determinist regardless of the
truthfulness of her argument. She can be granted such a status because of her
inherent capacity to comprehend D knowledge.
Finally, note that this peculiar dynamic between the
determinist’s philosophical mind and the universe can be best described through
a dialectic circle in Maybee (2020, Section 1). Before the determinist decides
on the determinacy of the events of the universe, these events must first be
placed within her scope of thought. In other words, they should become the
objects of her speculative investigation. Then, as she declares determinism,
she realizes that the entire process (from her investigation up to the
declaration) is also part of the deterministic scenario. Subsequently, she
concludes from a transient God’s-eye perspective that every time she declares
determinism, this would have also been predetermined.
The above process continues,[16]
thereby generating the dialectic circle.[17]
It expands as the determinist’s mind and the objects/events of the universe
continue to encircle each other in an alternating manner. As this dialectic circle continues to grow, “the opposition or
antithesis between the subjective and objective disappears” (Maybee, 2020,
Section 3). As it matures into a stage of Absolute Spirit, the philosophical
mind targeting itself through a deterministic outlook on the universe would
achieve total identity with itself.
Conclusion
Deterministic knowledge:
l Type
1
n Dictates the
world.
n Includes
finite conditional cases.
l Type
2
n Reflects the
world.
n Includes
no counterfactual cases.
l Type
3
n Is
generated by the world.
n Includes
infinite counterfactual cases.
Based on the above scheme, this paper has sought to
distinguish human from machine intelligence by allowing for determinism.
Additionally, it addressed how to justify the omniscient perspective required for a
determinist to assert determinism despite being placed within the universe.
However,
this paper may face several challenges from readers.
First, one
might point out that the paper relies only on metaphysical speculation and
lacks empirical support. However, many philosophical ideas are inherently speculative,
aiming to look beyond the realm of empirical science. Despite their purely
speculative nature, they can meaningfully influence the empirical world. For
instance, this paper’s framework can be taken as a normative model for human
vs. machine intelligence. Under this model, we can consider measuring a level
of enhancement in a connectionist-based AI by studying its response to a
history of its replica provided as a certain kind of “D knowledge.”
Second, one
might argue that the VP problem is not really a problem. She may have no
difficulty accepting the idea that a determinist can describe the universe from
a viewpoint situated within the universe. She can conveniently appeal to the
causality principle to support determinism. However, causality itself does not
tell us very much about her status as an intellectual being. If she conflates
herself with mindless machines in accordance with pancomputationalism, her
concern for the truth of determinism becomes insignificant. Philosophical
truths are dead issues to mechanical beings. What this paper has done is
illustrate a subtle difference between human and machine intelligence by
assuming that both adhere to causality.
Finally, one could assert that this
paper’s main idea totally collapses if determinism is wrong. Indeed, if the
universe is indeterministic, the VP problem is no longer a problem. It
naturally vanishes since indeterminism would suggest that the philosophical
investigator of the universe is in the process of discovering how the universe
is unfolding. But would the distinction between human and machine intelligence
still hold? One way of postulating their difference could be to argue as
follows in a counterfactual manner. If a human agent in the past received our
knowledge of her history (which would be regarded as a form of future knowledge
for her), she would generate a non-trivial response to it. However, a machine
agent would not be able to.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author
extends gratitude to Jae-ok Lee and Jia-wei Li (“Mili”) for their advice.
Withpermission, the author would also like to acknowledge Dr. Robert Hanna for
his kindfeedback. Thanks to his identification of an issue with an earlier
version of the paper, theauthor successfully redefined the “vantage point
problem” to enhance its rigor.
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[1]
Vihvelin (2023) proposes “[leaving] open the metaphysical possibility of time
travel to the past” (Abstract). This concept is philosophically worth
considering, even though it is unlikely to materialize in reality. Note that
her proposal implicitly involves the idea of providing D knowledge to an agent
in the past.
[2]
We assume that the cognitive agent receives only a “small breadth” of D
knowledge that is associated with the agent. The entirety of D knowledge would
be too immense to be processed by any agent.
[3]
Müller (2014) indicates that two different physical processes P1
and P2 can perform the same computation C (p. 9). Similarly, the
original and simulated worlds are computationally the same but ultimately
different.
[4]
A representation-bearer is a means
through which an object being represented is thought/perceived by an agent. See
Frankish & Ramsey (2012, p. 9).
[5]
Connectionism suggests that “individual neurons do not transmit large amounts
of symbolic information” and that “they compute by being appropriately
connected to large numbers of similar units” (Feldman & Ballard, 1982, p.
208).
[6]
Testing whether a connectionist-based AI could think like humans may require a
different approach like Schneider’s (2019) ACT test (p. 54). Or we can imagine
testing the AI by feeding it with a history of its replica as a certain kind of
“D knowledge.”
[7]
Regarding a universal proposition that “[a]lways, given an A, a B follows,”
Steward (2022) cites Anscombe, who suggests that our inability to “describe the
absence of circumstances in which an A would not cause a B” challenges
identification of causation with necessitation (p. 9). In other words, it is
possible that “A” causes “B” but it is not necessary for “B” to follow.
Nevertheless, this possibility does not justify the “conclusion that
determinism is certainly false” (p. 12).
[8]
(xn+1), (xn+2),
(yn+1), and (yn+2) are enclosed in their parentheses to
highlight that they are unique counterfactual cases associated with D
knowledge.
[9] Similarly, Sterelny (1990) notes that the “ability to
think about the world as it is and as it might be, to think indefinitely many
and indefinitely complex thoughts” may be a “necessary condition on having
intentional states” (p. 29).
[10]
When considering the infinite
counterfactual cases, we see that no predefined type of D knowledge (i.e., Type
1) can simulate a world genuinely resembling the original world.
[11]
This configuration may be beyond our reach as demonstrated through the Kantian
antinomies (Kant, 1998, pp. 470-495).
[12]
Tegmark is a determinist. He supports Einstein’s dictum that “God does not play
dice” (p. 10).
[13]
Even if she had all the information regarding her mind/body as well as the car
from a materialistic viewpoint, she might still fail to explain how her bodily
composition gives rise to consciousness. Even a complete mathematical
formulation of the neural correlates of consciousness may not fully elucidate
its nature. Such an “epistemological limitation” may be a necessary condition
for consciousness, as “the transcendental standpoint is in a sense irreducible,
for one cannot look ‘objectively’ at oneself” (Žižek, 2012, p. 239).
[14]
Simply speaking, we could show a non-trivial response to the knowledge of our
future if we were to receive it.
[15]
According to pancomputationalism, “everything is a computing system” and “minds
are computing systems too” (Piccinini, 2007, p. 95).
[16]
This type of infinite progression is believed to be a central feature of
philosophy, as seen in Kripke’s “Kripkenstein,” Derrida’s “différance,”
Sheffer’s logocentric predicament, the liar paradox, Lao Tzu’s Taoism, and so
on.
[17]
This type of circle provides a
more nuanced illustration than the image of “eye” of the “metaphysical subject”
encapsulated within “the field of sight” in Wittgenstein (1922, p. 75), as well
as a different image that one may newly draw by placing the eye outside the field
of sight.
